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BATTLEFIELD BORDERS, THREAT RHETORIC, AND 
THE MILITARIZATION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
ENFORCEMENT
Danielle C. JefferiS1
i.  intrOduCtiOn
I have my own army within the N.Y.P.D., which is the seventh biggest army in the world.
 - New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, Nov. 20112
The “war on terror” is a war anchored in rhetoric.3  It is a war of  abstract words — evil, good, 
and freedom — and words of  emotion — anger, hatred, and patriotism.  And as a war anchored in 
rhetoric, the sovereign authority possesses significant discretion in choosing the words with which to 
color the abstractions and shape the contours of  the conflict.  
This article analyzes the rhetoric of  the war on terror and the particular role that rhetoric plays 
1  Danielle C. Jefferis received her Juris Doctor from Georgetown Law in 2012.  She thanks Professor Frances 
DeLaurentis and the 2011-12 Senior Writing Fellows for their ideas toward developing this article, as well as the editors 
of  the National Security Law Brief  for their tireless efforts preparing it for publication.  She also owes immeasurable 
gratitude to Mike German and Professor Sahar Aziz for their keen insight and invaluable support.
2  Hunter Walker, Mayor Bloomberg: ‘I Have My Own Army’, N.Y. OBServer (Nov. 30, 2011, 10:06 AM), http://www.
politicker.com/2011/11/30/mayor-bloomberg-i-have-my-own-army-11-30-11/. 
3  See, e.g., Richard Jackson, Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of  Counter-Terrorism, 1 demOCraCY & SeCuritY 147, 148 
(2005) (“The language of  the ‘war on terrorism’ is not a neutral or objective reflection of  policy debates and the realities 
of  terrorism and counter-terrorism.  Rather, it is a very carefully and deliberately constructed — but ultimately, artificial 
— discourse that was specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible, and ‘good,’ as well as to silence 
any forms of  knowledge or counter-argument that would challenge the exercise of  state power.”). 
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in defining the geographic scope of  the “battlefield” on which the war is waged.4  The article posits 
that in the war on terror, where traditional markers of  conflict are largely absent, the Executive has 
substantial latitude to define and shape the contours of  the conflict, employing carefully designed 
threat rhetoric to garner support for the use of  force in regions and areas that are far removed from 
any site of  actual armed conflict or hostilities.  The rhetoric surrounding the homegrown terrorism 
threat is an apt example: the Executive’s carefully crafted threat rhetoric concerning the danger of  
al-Qaeda “reaching in” to the United States to recruit and radicalize American Muslims necessarily 
implies that the battlefield extends into U.S. borders.  And where the battlefield extends, character-
istics of  the war paradigm follow — notably, the militarization of  state and local law enforcement.  
From acquiring military weapons and equipment to adopting military tactics and a soldier’s ethos, 
the militarization of  state and local police threatens to disrupt a vital separation between the police 
and military in domestic affairs and, consequently, detrimentally transform the ways in which police 
officers and citizens perceive each other.  With that transformation comes substantial risk of  the 
erosion of  fundamental constitutional protections inherent to our criminal law paradigm.
Part II introduces the war paradigm and discusses the importance of  defining the geographic 
scope of  the battlefield; Part II also shows the divergent views of  the battlefield in the war on terror 
since September 11, 2001 — while the Executive has characterized the war on terror as a global, 
borderless battlefield, the Judiciary was initially reluctant to accept this conceptualization.  Part III 
discusses the ambiguity of  the term “terrorism” and the power of  threat rhetoric in defining and 
shaping the nontraditional conflict, particularly in light of  our modern conception of  “national 
security” anchored in executive expertise and secrecy.  The rhetoric surrounding the 2003 invasion 
of  Iraq provides a potent example of  the power of  threat rhetoric in garnering public support for 
the use of  force.  As Part III argues, the Executive’s rhetoric concerning the homegrown terror-
ism threat is likely to function similarly.  But where the Iraq threat rhetoric garnered support for 
the use of  force in Iraq, the homegrown terrorism rhetoric is aimed to garner support for aspects 
of  the war paradigm in the United States — that is, extending the battlefield to include the United 
States.  And by exercising increased deference to the Executive on national security matters, includ-
ing declining to address the geographic scope of  the battlefield, the Judiciary is unlikely to employ 
sufficient scrutiny over the extension of  the battlefield.  Part IV discusses one particularly troubling 
implication of  this extension of  the battlefield into the United States, which necessarily follows 
4  This article does not address the legality of  the “war on terrorism” itself  under international or domestic law, nor 
does it analyze the legality of  a borderless war.  Volumes have been written on varying aspects of  whether the “war 
on terrorism” is truly an armed conflict under international humanitarian law or the law of  war. See e.g., Matthew C. 
Waxman, The Structure of  Terrorism Threats and the Laws of  War, 20 duke J. COmP. & int’l l. 429 (2010); David Turns, 
The “War on Terror” Through British and International Humanitarian Law Eyes: Comparative Perspectives on Selected Legal Issues, 10 
n.Y. CitY l. rev. 435 (2007); Bruce Ackerman, This is Not a War, 113 Yale L.J. 1871 (2004); Karl M. Meessen, Unilateral 
Recourse to Military Force Against Terrorist Attacks, 28 Yale J. int’l l. 341 (2003).; Marco Sassoli, Use and Abuse of  the Laws 
of  War in the “War on Terrorism”, 22 law & ineq. 195 (2004).  Similarly, for a discussion of  the legality of  a borderless 
war, see, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters 
of  the Zone of  Combat, 39 ga. J. int’l & COmP. l. 1 (2010); Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Legal Case Against the Global War on 
Terror, 36 CaSe w. reS. J. int’l l. 349 (2004). 
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from the Executive’s homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric: the militarization of  state and local law 
enforcement.  This shift threatens the delicate but critical separation of  law enforcement officers 
and military personnel in domestic affairs and risks transforming police — protectors of  peace and 
public safety — into soldiers and citizens into enemies.
ii.  the war Paradigm and COnfliCting viewS Of the “Battlefield”
Before 2001, the United States generally treated terrorist attacks by international groups against 
U.S. interests, domestically and internationally, as criminal acts and alleged terrorists as suspected 
criminals.5  Like others suspected of  “ordinary” crimes, individuals allegedly involved in terrorist acts 
passed through the criminal justice system: they were charged under criminal statutes6 and, conse-
quently, the constitution guaranteed them due process and a fair trial by their peers.7 
The events of  September 11, 2001 and the Executive’s response to those events fundamentally 
changed the public’s collective conception of  terrorism.8  Whereas the Clinton administration con-
sistently characterized the 1993 World Trade Center bombing as a heinous criminal act and assured 
5  E.g., United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 107-08 (2d Cir. 1998) (criminal conviction of  Ramzi Yousef  for 1993 
World Trade Center bombing); United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (criminal prosecution 
for plans to bomb buildings and tunnels in New York City); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 675-76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996) (criminal prosecution of  Ramzi Yousef  for conspiracy to bomb U.S. commercial airliners overseas); see also Mary 
Ellen O’Connell, The Choice of  Law Against Terrorism, 4 J. nat’l SeCuritY l. & POl’Y 343, 347 (2010) (noting statements 
made by United States political figures stating that terrorists should be subject to criminal laws); Lloyd C. Anderson, The 
Detention Trilogy: Striking the Proper Balance Between National Security and Individual Liberty in an Era of  Unconventional Warfare, 
27 whittier l. rev. 217,  232-33 (2005) (discussing U.S.’s initial response to al-Qaeda, pre-2001, as one of  criminal 
prosecution); Tom A Gizzo & Tama S. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Use of  the Military in the 
Struggle Against International Terrorism, 15 PaCe int’l l. rev. 149, 150 (2003) (“[T]errorism is defined as a law enforcement 
issue rather than a national security issue.”); Ronald J. Sievert, War on Terrorism or Global Law Enforcement Operation?, 78 
nOtre dame l. rev. 307, 310-11 (2003) (discussing civilian criminal prosecutions of  terrorist attacks on U.S. interests 
throughout the 1990s).  But see David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. nat’l SeCuritY l. & POl’Y 
1, 3-4 (2011) (discussing a finding of  the 9/11 Commission that pre-9/11, the CIA played lead role in confronting al-
Qaeda and law enforcement was secondary).
6  Prior to September 11, 2001, federal criminal statutes of  which individuals suspected of  terrorism or acts related to 
terrorism were commonly charged were contained in Title 18, Part I, Chapter 113B and included provisions against the 
use of  weapons of  mass destruction and providing material support to designated terrorist organizations.  
7  For example, the convicted perpetrator of  the 1993 World Trade Center bombing — arguably the most significant 
terrorist attack by an international group or figure on domestic soil before September 11, 2001 — was tried on criminal 
counts of  conspiracy and transporting explosives, among others.  See Salameh, 261 F.3d at 274.
8  E.g., Richard Jackson, writing the war On terrOriSm 38 (2005) (“Almost simultaneously, the [September 11] 
attacks began to be grammatically reconstructed as acts of  ‘war’ rather than terrorism or criminal exploits.”); O’Connell, 
supra note 5, at 368 (“On 9/11, the United States made a radical change in its choice of  law in defending against 
terrorism.  After a century of  pursuing terrorists using criminal law and police methods, the United States invoked the 
law of  armed conflict and military means.”); Anderson, supra note 5, at 233 (“The United States had abandoned the 
policy of  treating al Qaeda’s acts of  war as criminal acts, and declared war on its network of  transnational terrorism.”).
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the nation that law enforcement authorities would apprehend the suspected perpetrators,9 the Bush 
administration characterized the September 11 attacks as acts of  war,10 pitting “good” versus “evil” 
in a “monumental struggle,”11 and vowed to “conquer the enemy.”12  In his Address to the Nation 
on the day of  the attacks, President Bush declared, “[W]e stand together to win the war against 
terrorism.”13  And in one of  the clearest expressions of  the shift in the Executive’s conception of  
terrorism, President Bush declared in his 2004 State of  the Union address: 
I know some people question if  America is really in a war at all.  They view terrorism more as a 
crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.  After the World Trade 
Center was first attacked in 1993, some of  the guilty were indicted and tried and convicted and sent 
to prison.  But the matter was not settled.  The terrorists were still training and plotting in other 
nations and drawing up more ambitious plans.  After the chaos and carnage of  September the 11th, 
it is not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers.  The terrorists and their supporters declared 
war on the United States, and war is what they got.14
Why this conceptual shift?  As this section explains, shifting the paradigm under which harmful 
acts are conceived simultaneously shifts the sovereign’s expected response to those acts: under the 
9  E.g., President’s Radio Address, 1 PuB. PaPerS 215, 215 (Feb. 27, 1993) (assuring officials that “full measure of  
Federal law enforcement resources will be brought to bear on this investigation,” including cooperation with local 
law enforcement); President’s Remarks on Receiving the Rotary International Award of  Honor and an Exchange 
With Reporters, 1 PuB. PaPerS 236, 236 (Mar. 4, 1993) (praising law enforcement authorities’ response to bombing); 
President’s Interview With Dan Rather of  CBS News, 1 PuB. PaPerS 346, 350 (Mar. 24, 1993) (noting suspect in 
bombing was arrested in Egypt and brought to U.S.); see also Op-Ed., Day of  Terror, and Questions, n.Y. timeS, Feb. 28, 
1993, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/28/opinion/day-of-terror-and-questions.html (“[A]uthorities are 
operating on the assumption that a bomb caused the explosion [at the World Trade Center] and are pursuing a criminal 
investigation.”); Anderson, supra note 5, at 232 (noting the Clinton administration treated 1993 bombing as a “criminal 
act that should be resolved within the criminal justice system”). 
10  E.g., President’s Remarks Following a Meeting With the National Security Team, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1100, 1100 (Sept. 
12, 2001) (“[The attacks] were acts of  war.”); President’s Remarks in a Telephone Conversation With New York City 
Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani and New York Governor George E. Pataki and an Exchange with Reporters, 2 PuB. PaPerS 
1103, 1104 (Sept. 13, 2001) (discussing “new kind of  war” that “has been declared on America”); President’s Remarks at 
the National Day of  Prayer and Remembrance Service, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1108, 1108 (Sept. 14, 2001) (“War has been waged 
against us by stealth and deceit and murder.”); President’s Remarks in a Meeting with the National Security Team and 
an Exchange with Reporters at Camp David, Maryland, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1111, 1111-12 (Sept. 15, 2001) (“Underneath our 
tears is the strong determination of  America to win this war. . . . We’re at war.  There has been an act of  war declared 
upon America by terrorists, and we will respond accordingly.”); President’s Address Before a Joint Session of  the 
Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of  September 11, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 
2001) (“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of  
global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”).
11  President’s Remarks Following a Meeting With the National Security Team, supra note 10, at 1101 (“The freedom-
loving nations of  the world stand by our side.  This will be a monumental struggle of  good versus evil, but good will 
prevail.”). 
12  Id. at 1100.
13  President’s Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11, 2001).
14  President’s Address Before a Joint Session of  Congress on the State of  the Union, 1 PuB. PaPerS 81, 83-84 (Jan. 
20, 2004).
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criminal law paradigm, the sovereign’s expected response is to investigate, arrest, and prosecute the 
suspect;15 under the war paradigm, the expected response is to attack, kill, and defeat the enemy.16  
According to classical theories, both responses aim to achieve some version of  “justice,”17 but the 
legal frameworks under which the responding government operates differ starkly.18  The choice is 
one of  policy, and the consequences vary significantly.19
The “battlefield” is the notion around which these paradigmatic principles coalesce.  Section 
A of  this part shows why defining the geographic scope of  the battlefield matters in establishing 
the operative legal framework.  Sections B and C describe the positions of  the Executive and the 
Judiciary with regard to the geographic scope of  the battlefield post-September 11, 2001.  Both the 
Bush and Obama administrations have conceptualized the battlefield as a global one, encompass-
ing a worldwide war against al-Qaeda.  In the first few years after September 11, 2001, the Judi-
ciary exhibited restraint in adopting a similar position, adhering to a more traditional notion of  a 
battlefield constrained by active hostilities.  As Part III posits, however, judicial restraint has waned.  
Courts have exhibited increased deference to the Executive on national security policy matters and, 
specifically, have declined to address the geographic scope of  the battlefield in at least two cases 
that squarely presented the issue.  Simultaneously, the Executive has put forward increased rhetoric 
concerning the threat posed by al-Qaeda “reaching into” the United States to recruit and radicalize 
Americans.  In doing so, the Executive is shaping the conflict as a global war on a borderless battle-
field, which, accordingly, includes the United States.20  With that extension of  the battlefield comes 
significant changes in the conception and role of  state and local law enforcement. 
15  E.g., Cynthia A. Brown, Divided Loyalties: Ethical Challenges for America’s Law Enforcement in Post 9/11 America, 43 CaSe 
w. reS. J. int’l L. 651, 670 (2011) (“Police . . . enforce laws and keep the peace applying the minimal force necessary, 
bound by law to ensure civil liberties and protect life.  The goals of  law enforcement center around the capture of  
criminal suspects in order to bring them to trial. . . .”); Kris, supra note 5, at 19-23 (discussing the benefits of  involving 
law enforcement and criminal law paradigm — investigation, arrest, and prosecution — in counterterrorism operations).
16  E.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 670 (“The military, employed almost exclusively against external enemies in times of  
war, are trained to kill by the use of  overwhelming force.”). 
17  The “just war” theory around which the Uniform Code of  Military Justice is formulated seeks to examine the 
“justice of  war” and serves as a guide for determining whether any particular act of  war is “just” or “moral.”  Id. at 
662; see also John F. Coverdale, An Introduction to the Just War Tradition, 16 PaCe int’l l. rev. 221, 234 (2004) (“The 
starting point in classic just war theory was an injustice that needed to be remedied, and war was viewed as a potential 
way of  remedying that injustice.”); Mark Edward DeForrest, Just War Theory and the Recent U.S. Air Strikes Against Iraq, 1 
gOnzaga J. int’l l. 4 (1997/98) (discussing the origins and principles of  just war theory).
18  See infra Section II.A; see also Jackson, supra note 3, at 151 (“Re-constructing [the attacks] primarily as an ‘act of  
war’ however, conferred on the state powers reserved for the supreme emergency, as well as domestic and international 
justification for military-based self-defense.”). 
19  See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Claims and Counterclaims, wall St. J., Oct. 5, 2006, at A20 (discussing 
“which legal paradigm — war or law enforcement — makes most sense in meeting the threat”); Jackson, supra note 3, at 
150-51 (arguing that shifting the framework under which the attacks were conceptualized “was central . . . to justifying a 
war-based, rather than a criminal justice-based, counter-terrorist response.”). 
20  See, e.g., Nick J. Sciullo, On the Language of  (Counter)terrorism and the Legal Geography of  Terror, 48 willamette l. rev. 
317, 328 (2012) (“Because if  there is not some geopolitical locus where we might act, might engage in war, then war is 
justifiable everywhere.”).
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A.  Why Defining the Battlefield Matters
Defining the geographic scope of  the battlefield21 is a fundamental exercise of  sovereign power 
with significant implications for the rule of  law because it triggers the legal framework under which 
the sovereign authority operates.22  Typically when operating within the battlefield, the law of  war 
applies.23  When operating outside the battlefield, human rights law and, domestically, civilian crimi-
nal law applies.24  
The criminal law paradigm and the war paradigm are distinct in the actions lawfully permitted 
and the rights and protections afforded to individuals.  Under the U.S. criminal law paradigm, in 
most circumstances the sovereign authority may only arrest an individual upon probable cause that 
the individual has committed a crime.25  Lethal force is a last resort: the sovereign is restricted from 
taking lethal force against individuals to situations in which a law enforcement officer has probable 
cause to believe the individual poses a threat of  serious physical harm — and lethal force may only 
21  For a discussion of  defining the temporal scope of  the battlefield, see, e.g., Adam Klein, Comment, The End of  Al 
Qaeda? Rethinking the Legal End of  the War on Terror, 110 COlum. l. rev. 1865 (2010). 
22  See, e.g., Blank, supra note 4, at 15 (“Thus, above all else, when leaders invoke the battlefield . . . they seek to harness 
the authority to use force as a first resort against those identified as the enemy.”); Rivkin, Jr. & Casey, supra note 19 
(discussing the policy choices behind operating within criminal law or war paradigm in responding to terrorist acts); Nick 
J. Sciullo, supra note 20, at 321-22 (“Law is intimately tied to space.  Our geographical imagination helps order the law.  
Place matters, whether one speaks of  jurisdiction, the law’s reach, sovereignty, or many other questions common in legal 
discourse.”). 
23  This article focuses on the law governing conduct during war, also known as jus in bello, and not the law governing 
the justifications for entering or declaring war, known as jus ad bellum.  The jus in bello war paradigm, also known as 
the “law of  armed conflict” (LOAC) or “international humanitarian law” (IHL) is shaped largely by the two Hague 
Conventions and the four Geneva Conventions (August 12, 1949) and their Additional Protocols.  See Hague Convention 
(II) on the Laws and Customs of  War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1817; Hague Convention (IV), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2301; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  the Condition of  the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in 
the Field, art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of  
the Condition of  Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of  the Armed Forces at Sea, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, art. 129, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [Geneva III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of  Civilian Persons in 
Time of  War, art. 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [Geneva IV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of  12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of  Victims of  Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
24  E.g., Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of  Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of  War on 
Land, Oct. 18, 1907, (describing rights and duties of  neutral powers); see also Blank, supra note 4, at 14-15 n.53; Ved P. 
Nanda, Introductory Essay: International Law Implications of  the United States’ “War on Terror”, 37 denv. J. int’l l. & POl’Y 
513, 514 (2009).
25  United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 422-24 (1976) (permitting warrantless arrest if  officers have probable 
cause to believe individual has committed crime); see also Wayne A. Logan, Contingent Constitutionalism: State and Local 
Criminal Laws and the Applicability of  Federal Constitutional Rights, 51 wm. & marY l. rev. 143, 152 (2010) (discussing the 
implication of  Atwater v. City of  Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), on the authority of  officers to make warrantless 
arrests when probable cause is satisfied).
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be used to prevent the individual’s escape.26  Criminal suspects receive fundamental constitutional 
protections and civil liberties, including the presumption of  innocence,27 the right to due process,28 
the right to counsel,29 the right to be tried by a jury of  one’s peers,30 and the right to confront one’s 
accusers.31
In contrast, under the war paradigm the sovereign is lawfully permitted to use coercive, including 
lethal, force against any individual deemed to be part of  the enemy.32  Those fundamental individual 
protections under the criminal law paradigm quickly give way to the exigencies of  battle.  Although 
the laws of  war afford some basic protections to enemy soldiers, those protections are a far cry from 
the substantive and procedural rights of  criminal suspects.33  Ultimately, when a soldier confronts an 
enemy during war, the soldier’s fundamental mission is clear: overcome the enemy for the sake of  
victory.34  Achieving that mission often demands lethal force.35 
B.  The Executive: A Global War on a Worldwide Battlefield
Under both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, the Executive has defined the post-
September 11, 2001 conflict as a war on terror waged on a worldwide, borderless battlefield.36  In his 
address to Congress just nine days after the attacks, President Bush intrepidly vowed to fight terror-
26  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 10 (1985) (“The use of  deadly force to prevent the escape of  all felony suspects, 
whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable . . . [But w]here the officer has probable cause to believe 
that the suspect poses a threat of  serious physical harm either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.”); see also Geoffrey S. Corn, Back to the Future: De Facto Hostilities, 
Transnational Terrorism, and the Purpose of  the Law of  Armed Conflict, 30 u. Pa. J. int’l l. 1345, 1353 (2009) (“At the most 
basic level, law enforcement treats the use of  deadly force as a measure of  last resort.”); Sean J. Kealy, Reexamining the 
Posse Comitatus Act: Toward a Right to Civil Law Enforcement, 21 Yale l. & POl’Y rev. 383, 386-87 (2003) (“[P]olice officers 
have a duty to use minimum force, and only when reasonably justified, in accomplishing their mission.”). 
27  See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (establishing presumption of  innocence of  persons accused of  
crimes).
28  U.S. COnSt. amendS. v & xiv. 
29  U.S. COnSt. amend. vi.
30  u.S. COnSt. amend. vii.
31  u.S. COnSt. amend. vi. 
32  Cf. Geneva IV, art. 3(1) (prohibiting use of  force against persons taking no active part in hostilities); see also 
O’Connell, supra note 5, at 345, 351–52 (“Under international law, in an armed conflict enemy fighters may be targeted 
and killed in situations not permitted in peace. . . .  Within an armed conflict, lawful combatants are not restricted to 
killing only to save a human life immediately [as in the criminal law paradigm].  Opposing combatants and civilians taking 
a direct part in hostilities may be killed in a zone of  armed conflict hostilities unless they surrender or an alternative is 
available and dictated by the principles of  humanity.”). 
33  See generally Geneva IV (establishing the rights of  prisoners of  war). 
34  E.g., Arthur Rizer and Joseph Hartman, How the War on Terror Has Militarized the Police, the atlantiC (Nov. 7, 
2011, 3:11 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/how-the-war-on-terror-has-militarized-the-
police/248047/# (discussing the role of  soldiers). 
35  E.g., Blank, supra note 4, at 14-15 (noting LOAC permits use of  force as “first resort against legitimate targets”); 
Corn, supra note 26, at 1353 (“[A]rmed conflict is defined by the authority to use deadly force as a measure of  first 
resort.”). 
36  Infra Section II.B.
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ism in every corner of  the earth.37  Although not as expressly expansive, the Obama Administration 
has echoed that policy, affirming that we are at war with al-Qaeda wherever the group’s members 
may be.38
In his address to the nation on the evening of  September 11, 2001, the nation’s response to the 
attacks appeared to be consistent to the response throughout preceding decades — within the crimi-
nal law paradigm: President George W. Bush proclaimed, “The search is underway for those who are 
behind these evil acts.  I’ve directed the full resources of  our intelligence and law enforcement com-
munities to find those responsible and bring them to justice.”39  
However, the following day the administration’s discourse changed.  The attacks no longer 
necessitated law enforcement resources; to the contrary, the President declared the attacks acts of  
war,40 and the necessary and appropriate response was to engage in battle.41  In public remarks on 
September 12, 2001, following a meeting with the national security team, Bush proclaimed, “The de-
liberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts 
of  terror.  They were acts of  war.”42  On September 19, 2001, Bush urged that “[t]he mindset of  war 
must change.”43  Specifically rebuking the need for a defined battlefield, Bush stated, “[T]his is a new 
type of  struggle . . . [T]errorism knows no borders.”44 
As the days passed and the Executive formulated and commenced its response to the attacks, it 
became clear that President Bush’s rhetoric meant something more than inspiration for a grieving 
nation.  The rhetoric was carefully designed to shift the paradigm under which the nation’s response 
to the September 11 attacks would operate.45  By declaring war on “terrorism”— an indefinable 
abstraction46 — the Executive seized the power to shape the conflict and thus apply the paradigm 
37 President’s Address Before a Joint Session of  the Congress on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks 
of  September 11, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1140, 1142 (Sept. 20, 2011) (“Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not 
end there.  It will not end until every terrorist group of  global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”).
38  Infra Section II.B.
39  President’s Address to the Nation on the Terrorist Attacks, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1099, 1100 (Sept. 11, 2001).
40  Supra note 9 (collecting official statements). 
41  E.g., President’s Radio Address, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1113, 1113 (Sept. 15, 2001) (“Those who make war against the 
United States have chosen their own destruction.”); President’s Remarks on Arrival at the White House and an Exchange 
with Reporters, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1114, 1116 (Sept. 16, 2001) (“This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while, 
and the American people must be patient.”).
42  President’s Remarks Following a Meeting with the National Security Team, supra note 10, at 1100. 
43  President’s Remarks Prior to Discussions with President Megawati Sukarnoputri of  Indonesia and an Exchange 
with Reporters, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1129, 1130 (Sept. 19, 2001). 
44  Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). 
45  See, e.g., Wojtek Mackiewicz Wolfe, winning the war Of wOrdS 45 (2008) (“Up until September 11, all mentions 
of  terrorism and war were separate.  Nearly all references of  war were historical in nature, usually mentioned on military 
holidays and aimed at specific rather than general audiences.  By framing war and terror as a single concept, Bush seized 
the moment to combine two traditionally separate forms of  foreign policy.”); Jackson, supra note 12, at 38 (“In probably 
the most important discursive move of  all, the [September 11] attacks were remade from acts of  terrorism, symbolic 
violence and political murder by non-state actors, to acts of  ‘war.’”).
46  Infra, Section III.A.
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wherever “terrorism” may occur.47
The Bush administration’s aggressive position concerning the global battlefield did not wane, 
even as it was increasingly confronted with allegations of  abusive policies and practices that were en-
acted shortly after the September 11 attacks.  The Department of  Justice, a key voice of  the admin-
istration’s policy positions, repeatedly argued before the courts that the United States is engaged in 
a global war.  In Rasul v. Bush, the administration characterized the case as “aris[ing] in the midst of  
the global armed conflict in which the United States is currently engaged against the al Qaeda terrorist 
network and its supporters.”48  In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the administration argued again that the United 
States is engaged in a global armed conflict.49  And in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the administration boldly as-
serted that the “authority of  the Commander in Chief  to engage and defeat the enemy encompasses 
the capture and detention of  enemy combatants wherever found, including within the Nation’s borders.”50 
In 2006 the acting head of  the Department of  Justice’s Office of  Legal Counsel testified before 
a closed session of  Congress that the President was authorized to order targeted killings inside the 
United States on the basis of  the global war on terror.51
Taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama’s administration publicly announced that 
it had “dropped [the phrase] ‘war on terror’ from its lexicon,”52  In place of  the oft-cited phrase of  
47  See, e.g., Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001) (expressing no 
geographical limits in authorization for President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against those responsible 
for September 11, 2001 attacks); Military Order of  Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of  Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 222 (2001) (containing no geographical limit for waging war on 
terror).
48  Brief  for the Respondents at 7, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 425739, at *1 
(emphasis added).
49  Brief  for the Respondents at 11, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *15 
(“[T]he military’s settled authority to detain captured enemy combatants in wartime applies squarely to the global armed 
conflict in which the United States is currently engaged.”).
50  Brief  for the Petitioner at 10, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S.426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 542777, at *14. 
51  Katerina Ossenova, DOJ Official: President may have power to order terror suspects killed in United States, JuriSt (Feb. 5, 
2006, 2:39 PM), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2006/02/doj-official-president-may-have-power.php. 
52  National Strategy for Counterterrorism, white hOuSe 2 (2011) (“The United States deliberately uses the word 
‘war’ to describe our relentless campaign against al-Qa’ida.  However, this Administration has made it clear that we 
are not at war with the tactic of  terrorism or the religion of  Islam.  We are at war with a specific organization—al-
Qa’ida.”); see also Obama team drops ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, reuterS (Mar. 30, 2009, 7:46 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2009/03/30/us-obama-rhetoric-idUSTRE52T7MH20090330. 
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the Bush-era, the administration asserts instead that the nation is at war with al-Qaeda.53  Yet as an 
entity constrained by no borders, such rhetoric remains consistent with the notion that our nation is 
engaged in a global, borderless war. 
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism, the Executive’s official strategy position, again 
declares that the “preeminent security threat to the United States continues to be from al-Qaeda and 
its affiliates and adherents”54 and the “United States remains at war with al-Qaeda.”55  This strategy 
paper emphasizes al-Qaeda’s “regional and global agenda”56 and states that “[g]lobal communica-
tions and activity place al-Qaeda’s calls for violence and instructions for carrying it out within easy 
reach of  millions.”57  Its areas of  focus broadly include “the Homeland,” the Arabian Peninsula, 
East Africa, Europe, Iraq, the Maghreb and Sahel, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, South Asia.58  Al-
though some regions are not expressly identified, the paper then warns that al-Qaeda has the means 
to “shar[e] information and ideas globally,”59 leaving no corner of  the world safe from its reach.
Echoing this position, in September 2011 Deputy National Security Advisor John O. Brennan 
reaffirmed that “we are at war with al-Qaeda,”60 explaining that the “use of  military force against al-
Qa’ida [is not] restricted solely to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.”61  Harold Koh, Department of  
State Legal Adviser, has stated that “we continue to fight the perpetrators of  9/11: a non-state actor, 
al-Qaeda [and the Taliban].”62  And Attorney General Eric Holder reaffirmed in March 2012:
[The executive’s] legal authority is not limited to the battlefields in Afghanistan.  Indeed, neither 
Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of  our ability to use force to the 
53  President’s Remarks on National Security (May 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_
office/Remarks-by-the-President-On-National-Security-5-21-09 (“Now let me be clear: We are indeed at war with al 
Qaeda and its affiliates.”); see also Anthony Dworkin, Beyond the “War on Terror”: Towards a New Transatlantic Framework for 
Counterterrorism, 13 eur. COunCil On fOreign rel. 1, 5 (2009) (describing conflicting views of  counterterrorism efforts 
between U.S. and Europe: “Many Europeans recognize the existence of  an armed conflict against the Taliban and al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan; where the United States goes further is in extending the boundaries of  the conflict to take in 
al-Qaeda’s operations around the world.”); Nanda, supra note 24, at 532-33 (arguing Obama Administration continues 
to pursue global war on terror); John B. Bellinger, III, Terrorism and Changes to the Laws of  War, 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l 
L. 331, 332 (2010) (“The main point is that the legal framework that the Obama administration is applying continues to 
be a law of  war framework.  The President dropped the label of  ‘a Global War on Terror,’ and I think this was a good 
idea because this label did more harm than good.  But he is still pursuing, as a legal matter, a global war on al Qaeda and, 
more significantly, he is applying the laws of  war for detention and for targeting.”). 
54  National Strategy for Counterterrorism, supra note 52, at 3.
55  Id. 
56  Id. at 4.
57  Id.
58  Id. at 11-17.
59  Id. at 17.
60  Remarks of  John O. Brennan, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, white hOuSe (Sept. 16, 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-
adhering-our-values-an. 
61  Id.
62  Remarks of  Harold Hongju Koh, The Obama Administration and International Law, State deP’t (March 25, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm. 
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current conflict in Afghanistan.  We are at war with a stateless enemy, prone to shifting operations 
from country to country. . . .  Our government has both a responsibility and a right to protect this 
nation and its people from such threats.63
Indeed, both Presidents Bush and Obama have employed carefully crafted rhetoric concerning a 
worldwide war waged on a global battlefield.  As Part III argues, this rhetoric, when combined with 
the rhetoric concerning the threat of  homegrown terrorism, operates to bring the battlefield — and 
characteristics of  the war paradigm — to within our borders. 
C.  The Judiciary: A More Traditional View Early On
In the first cases that eventually made their way to the courts after September 11, 2001, the fed-
eral judiciary was reluctant to accept the Executive’s expansive conception of  a global battlefield.64  
As this section describes, the Supreme Court specifically opted to adhere to a more traditional 
notion of  a “theater” of  war or zone of  conflict akin to the site of  actual combat activities.  Lower 
courts also distinguished the “hot” battlefield of  Afghanistan from the United States, notwithstand-
ing an apprehended individual’s suspected threat or connection to al-Qaeda.  It seemed the courts 
were struggling to reconcile the Executive’s expansive view of  the battlefield with the reality of  the 
new, non-traditional conflict with al-Qaeda: where were the markers of  war, such as artillery and 
trenches?  Unfamiliarity with the “war on terror” led to the courts’ hesitancy to baldly accept the 
Executive’s conceptualization of  the battlefield.65   
The war on terror arrived to the courts in one form as cases of  unlawful detention and enemy 
combatant designations arising from arrests and captures in the aftermath of  the September 11 at-
tacks and the commencement of  U.S. military strikes on Afghanistan.  Two paramount cases dem-
onstrate the Judiciary’s traditional view of  the battlefield early on: Jose Padilla and Yaser Hamdi, two 
U.S. citizens designated and detained as enemy combatants soon after September 11, 2001.
Jose Padilla was suspected of  associating with al-Qaeda and of  planning terrorist attacks in the 
United States.66  He was not, however, accused of  being a member of  al-Qaeda.67  Padilla was ar-
rested in 2002 pursuant to a material witness warrant at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport as 
he returned from a trip to Pakistan.68  After a month in maximum-security detention, the President 
designated Padilla an enemy combatant, and he was transferred to the high-security Naval brig in 
63  Remarks of  Eric Holder, deP’t Of JuStiCe (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-
speech-1203051.html.
64  See, e.g., Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 698 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the U.S. as “outside a zone of  combat”); 
Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1064 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the U.S. is “distant from a zone of  
combat”); see also Laurie R. Blank, A Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of  War Detention Too Far, 63 rutgerS l. 
rev. 1169, 1177 (2011).
65  See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d at 711 (emphasizing that the court’s holding is limited to the case of  an American 
citizen detained in the United States and says nothing about individuals detained on the foreign battlefield.).
66  Id. at 698.
67  Id. at 701 (“Notwithstanding Padilla’s extensive contacts with al Qaeda members and his actions under their 
direction, the government does not allege that Padilla was a member of  al Qaeda.”).  
68  Id. at 699. 
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South Carolina.69  Padilla’s attorney petitioned for habeas corpus relief  on Padilla’s behalf.70
Despite the Executive’s allegations that Padilla had received explosives training from al-Qaeda 
members, as well as instructions from high-level al-Qaeda officials to carry out attacks in the United 
States in the name of al-Qaeda, the Second Circuit refused to accept the government’s assertion that 
the battlefield extends beyond the zone of  active combat.71  The court consistently distinguished 
between capture in Afghanistan and apprehension in the United States, holding that the President’s 
inherent war powers imbued in his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief  do not permit 
the detention of  a U.S. citizen “seized within the country away from a zone of  combat.”72 
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the Second Circuit’s holding on jurisdictional grounds, 
concluding that Padilla did not properly file his habeas petition in the Southern District of  New 
York.73  The majority did not reach the merits.74  Justice Stevens did, however, echo the Second 
Circuit’s traditional notions of  the battlefield in his dissent, writing that detention of  enemy soldiers 
may be appropriate to prevent them from returning to the battlefield,75 a concept integral to the 
lawfulness of  enemy combatant detention.  Such detention may not, however, “be justified by the 
naked interest in using lawful procedures to extract information.”76  For Justice Stevens, detention of  
an enemy combatant on or near the “hot” battlefield, or zone of  combat, is legitimate to prevent that 
individual from returning to the battlefield.  But Padilla, from within the United States, posed little 
risk of  returning to that active zone of  combat and therefore, his indefinite, process-less detention 
as an enemy combatant was problematic.77
Yaser Hamdi, on the other hand, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 by members of  the 
Northern Alliance and turned over to the U.S. military.78  Like Padilla, he was not accused of  being 
a member of  al-Qaeda, but he was alleged to have associated and trained with the Taliban79 — a 
regime known for its support of  al-Qaeda.80  Hamdi was transferred to and detained at Guantánamo 
Bay for several months, and in April 2002, upon learning that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, officials 
transferred him to the military brig in South Carolina.81  Labeled an “enemy combatant,” Hamdi was 
69  Id. at 700.
70  Id. at 698. 
71  See, e.g., id. at 710 (“We reemphasize, however, that our review is limited to the case of  an American citizen arrested 
in the United States, not on a foreign battlefield or while actively engaged in armed conflict against the United States.”) 
(emphasis added); id. at 712 (“Here, we find that the President lacks inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-
Chief  to detain American citizens on American soil outside a zone of  combat.”) (emphasis added); id. at 717 (distinguishing 
Hamdi on basis that Hamdi was captured “in a zone of  combat in Afghanistan”). 
72  Id. at 721 (emphasis added). 
73  See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004). 
74  Id. at 430. 
75  Id. at 465 (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
76  Id. 
77  Id. (“For if  this Nation is to remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of  tyrants 
even to resist an assault by the forces of  tyranny.”). 
78  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
79  Id. at 512–13.
80  Id. at 510.
81  Id.
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detained at the brig indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings.82  Hamdi’s father, acting as 
his son’s next friend, petitioned for habeas corpus relief83 and challenged the constitutionality of  
Hamdi’s detention.84  
The Fourth Circuit refused to extend the due process protections to Hamdi that the Second Cir-
cuit had afforded to Padilla.85  Judge Wilkinson, concurring, confronted the battlefield issue, bluntly 
stating that to “compare this battlefield capture [in Afghanistan] to the domestic arrest in Padilla v. 
Rumsfeld is to compare apples to oranges.”86  He emphasized the sensitive nature of  judicial review 
of  decisions made on “foreign battlefields”87 and distinguished Hamdi from Padilla — both citizens 
— on the basis of  the location of  capture: “[W]hen an American citizen is captured in an enemy 
country where we are engaged in active hostilities, we will require no more legal justification than 
what the government voluntarily provided to us in this case.”88  
Hence, despite Hamdi and Padilla’s similar connections to and associations with al-Qaeda, the 
locus of  their apprehension strongly guided the circuit courts’ analysis of  their detention.  Although 
the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s decision, holding that due process required that 
Hamdi receive a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for his detention due to his 
citizenship and the fact that he was detained in the United States,89 the Court similarly echoed the 
Fourth Circuit’s traditional conceptualization of  a battlefield limited to the zone of  active hostili-
ties.90
The Judiciary’s reluctance to accept the Executive’s expansive view of  the battlefield was a 
natural response to the launch of  the non-traditional war on terror — the courts lagged behind the 
executive in conceptualizing a “new” form of  armed conflict.  Ten years after the launch of  the war, 
however, courts have recently exhibited the opposite reluctance — shying away from addressing the 
difficult question of  how far the war on terror truly extends when squarely presented with the issue.  
In subsequent cases involving the use of  force beyond Afghanistan, courts have increasingly refused 
to confront the issue of  defining or limiting the geographic scope of  the battlefield, resting instead 
on canons of  deference to the executive.91  Deference to the Executive —the entity defining and 
shaping the contours of  the war — extends the battlefield far beyond Afghanistan.  As such, the Ex-
82  Id.
83  Id. at 511.
84  Id.
85  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J. concurring) (“The [Padilla] panel did not 
suggest that its holding would apply to any part of  the world where American troops might happen to be present.”). 
86  Id. (emphasis added). 
87  Id. at 343; see also id. at 342 n.2 (noting distinct nature of  “foreign battlefield capture”); id. at 347 n.5 (“[A]s one 
moves away from a foreign battlefield to the United States where civil courts are open and functioning, the deference 
due to the military’s battlefield decision decreases.”).
88  Id. at 349.
89  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
90  See, e.g., id. at 523-24 (“Justice Scalia largely ignores that context of  this case: a United States citizen captured in a 
foreign combat zone.”) (emphasis in original).
91  Infra Section III.D.
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ecutive’s mounting rhetoric of  the threat of  homegrown terrorism in the United States,92 combined 
with the courts’ refusal to scrutinize the scope of  the battlefield,93 threatens to bring the battlefield 
to the homeland. 
iii. threat rhetOriC, hOmegrOwn terrOriSm, and the legitimaCY defiCit 
Where markers of  traditional war are absent, defining the battlefield is in part an exercise in 
rhetoric.  In the nontraditional conflict labeled the war on terror, the geographic scope of  the 
battlefield is heavily influenced by the shape, color, and reach of  the Executive’s rhetoric concerning 
the present threat of  terrorism’s reach and influence.  Section A of  this Part introduces the concept 
of  threat rhetoric in the context of  a war on terror and our modern notion of  “security.”  Then, to 
demonstrate the efficacy of  threat rhetoric in garnering support for the use of  force and, in turn, 
in enlarging the geographic scope of  the battlefield, Section B describes the threat rhetoric suc-
cessfully employed by the Bush administration leading up to the 2003 invasion of  Iraq.  Section C 
draws parallels from the threat rhetoric surrounding the Iraq War to argue that the executive, with 
congressional support, is employing similar rhetoric concerning the threat of  homegrown terrorism 
within the United States to garner support for waging the war on terror on a global battlefield  and, 
accordingly, importing characteristics of  the war paradigm into the United States.  Section D argues 
that the homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric, premised primarily on secret intelligence in the hands 
of  experts within the Executive, reinforces a perceived legitimacy deficit within the Judiciary so that 
courts are likely to exercise increasing deference to the executive on matters of  post-September 11 
national security.  As Part IV argues, a global battlefield that includes the homeland leads to charac-
teristics of  the war paradigm employed within our borders — most notably for present purposes, 
the militarization of  state and local law enforcement. 
A.  Terrorism, Threat Rhetoric, and Security
Declaring war on an indefinable abstraction like terrorism affords the Executive discretion to 
shape, shift, and stretch the contours of  the conflict.  This includes the geographic scope of  the 
battlefield on which the conflict is waged.  The war on terror is in part an exercise of  power defined 
by the Executive’s own rhetoric identifying, coloring, and shading the present threat.  The Executive 
employs threat rhetoric to garner public support for increased executive power exercised in the name 
of  the war.94  And, as this part demonstrates, where our modern conception of  “security” — national 
security — rests on expertise and secrecy, the threat rhetoric is particularly powerful. 
92  Infra Section III.C.
93  Infra Section III.D.
94  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 664-65 (2011) (arguing that America’s leaders use carefully crafted rhetoric and 
propaganda to fit new war on terror into confines of  “just war” theory). 
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As a general concept divorced from any factual context, terrorism is an indefinable abstraction.95  
Despite the intense focus on terrorism in the recent decade, the international community has yet to 
settle on a single workable definition,96 and the U.S. domestic criminal code boasts numerous dif-
ferent standards.97  Often, the government’s “official definition” of  terrorism depends solely on the 
responding agency — the Department of  State, Department of  Defense, and Federal Bureau of  
Investigation each has its own official definition.98  Many state criminal codes also include some ver-
sion of  the crime of  “terrorism.”99
Terrorism is indefinable partly because no single definition could encompass the totality of  what 
it is defining.100  A definition must include general traits common to all manifestations of  the object 
defined: “[t]he definition is the reduction of  the multiplicity of  the phenomena to the unity of  a 
common background.”101  But there is no common background for acts of  terrorism: terrorism is 
merely a label for a particular type of  political violence, but the acts to which that label is assigned 
95  Many have, however, argued that crafting a single definition of  “terrorism” is in fact possible and necessary.  See, 
e.g., Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of  Terrorism and the Challenge of  Relativism, 27 CardOzO l. rev. 1987, 1995-97 
(2006); Susan Tiefenbrun, A Semiotic Approach to a Legal Definition of  Terrorism, 9 ilSa J. int’l & COmP. l. 357, 360-62 
(2003); Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POliCe PraC. & reSearCh 
287 (2002).
96  E.g., Sudha Setty, What’s in a Name? How Nations Define Terrorism Ten Years After 9/11, 33 u. Pa. J. int’l l. 1, 6-8 
(2011) (discussing inability of  international community to settle on definition of  terrorism); Alex Schmid, Terrorism — 
The Definitional Problem, 36 CaSe w. reS. J. int’l l. 375 (2004) (same); Tiefenbrun, supra note 95, at 363 (same).  But see 
Reuven Young, Defining Terrorism: The Evolution of  Terrorism as a Legal Concept in International Law, 29 B.C. int’l & COmP. 
l. rev. 23, 64-68 (2006) (arguing that one can discern a core international law definition of  terrorism from common 
elements and themes in United Nations resolutions).
97  Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of  Terrorism: The Problem of  Too Many Grails, J. Of legiSlatiOn 
249 (2004) (discussing twenty-two different definitions or descriptions of  terrorism in domestic law); see also Young, supra 
note 96, at 76-79. 
98  Compare 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (Dep’t of  State definition: “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents”) with 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (FBI definition: “the 
unlawful use of  force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of  political or social objectives”) and Dep’t of  Defense Directive 
2000.12 (DOD definition: “the calculated use of  violence or threat of  violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to 
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of  goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”); see also 
Mike German, thinking like a terrOriSt 33 (2007); Schmid, supra note 96, at 377.
99  See, e.g., ala. COde § 13A-10-151(1) (defining “terrorism”); Cal. Penal COde § 11416 (declaring “threat of  
terrorism” involves weapons of  mass destruction); miCh. Penal COde § 750.543B(a) (defining “act of terrorism”); 
n.Y. Penal law § 490.05(1) (defining “terrorism”).
100  See, e.g., German, supra note 98, at 29 (“Part of  the problem of  defining terrorism is semantic.  We use one 
word to describe too many different things, which . . . inevitably leads to unnecessary confusion.”) (citation omitted); 
Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1989-90 (“In order to define an object, one has to show the traits which are common 
to all the manifestations of  that object.  . . .  But when terrorism is studied, that reduction appears to be doomed to 
fail, for the word ‘terrorism’ applies to phenomena which have nothing in common.  Terrorism is so protean that no 
synthetic formula can grasp it.”); Perry, supra note 97, at 252 (citing “changing nature of  terrorism” as reason for lack of  
definitional consensus: “no definition can possible cover all varieties of  terrorism that have appeared through history”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
101  Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1990.
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have no inherent characteristics in common.102  Simply put, “[w]hen we look for the definition of  
terrorism, we are the victims of  a nominalistic fallacy: we believe that all the phenomena called ‘ter-
rorism’ have the same nature because they have the same name.”103
Terrorism is also indefinable because it is subjective.104  Terrorism is a “performative” term105 not 
a descriptive term.106 Labeling a particular act “terrorism” does not describe the act — it condemns 
that act and immediately identifies an enemy.107  The power of  performance, thus, is purely in the 
hands of  the labeler: he who employs the term “terrorism” unleashes its power.108  Hence, the oft-
102  See, e.g., Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1990 (“There are several forms of  violence which are called ‘terrorism,’ 
but they have nothing in common aside from their name.”); John Collins and Ross Glover, COllateral language 165 
(2002) (“‘Terrorism’ is nothing more than a name given to a small subset of  actions within the much larger category of  
political violence.”).
103  Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1990.
104  See, e.g., German, supra note 98, at 33 (“If  terrorism is considered a subjective notion that can change depending 
on the perspective of  the actors involved, then the terrorist’s point of  view is as relevant as anyone else’s.”); Noëlle 
Quénivet, The World After September 11: Has it Really Changed?, 16 eur. J. int’l l. 561, 562 (2005) (“Authors unanimously 
concede that there is no commonly agreed upon definition [of  terrorism], although there is widespread agreement that 
the concept carries with it a pejorative and subjective connotation.”); Jean-Marc Sorel, Some Questions About the Definition 
of  Terrorism and the Fight Against Its Financing, 14 eur. J. int’l l. 365, 366 (2003) (“[T]he border between resistance 
and terrorism remains subjective and contested.”).  But see Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1995 (arguing that there are 
nevertheless common, objectives characteristics of  terrorism — namely, its violent and political nature).
105  See J. L. Austin, hOw tO dO thingS with wOrdS (1962) (discussing the linguistic concept of  performative terms, 
where the utterance of  a term gives it part of  its meaning).
106  E.g., Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghost in the Global War on Terror: Critical Perspectives and Dangerous Implications for National 
Security and the Law, 3 drexel l. rev. 561, 566 (2011) (“To define something as terrorism is to politically assign values, 
and it results in constructing the terrorist as Other.  Defining terrorism is a political act that demands the oppressive 
politics of  Otherization.”); Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1991 (“The notion of  terrorism is not a descriptive one.  It 
is not used to describe an act and to ascribe certain traits to it.  Instead, the word ‘terrorism’ is used to condemn the 
act.”); Sami Zeidan, Desperately Seeking Definition: The International Community’s Quest for Identifying the Specter of  Terrorism, 36 
COrnell int’l l.J. 491, 491-92 (2004) (“The difficulty of  defining terrorism lies in the risk it entails of  taking positions.  
Left to its political meaning, terrorism easily falls prey to change that suits the interests of  particular states at particular 
times.”).
107  See, e.g., Upendra D. Acharya, War on Terror or Terror Wars: The Problem in Defining Terrorism, 37 denv. J. int’l l. & 
POl’Y 653, 656 (2009) (“The problem of  defining terrorism is further complicated in modern days by one party’s tactical 
use of  characterizing another party as a terrorist.”); Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1991 (“Terrorism is only the activity 
of  the enemy, whoever the enemy may be and whatever his activity may be.”); Quénivet, supra note 104, at 564 (“[T]o 
classify a group as a terrorist organization or freedom fighters using partly terrorist methods[] is a political decision.”) 
(quotations omitted); Sorel, supra 104, at 366 (“The expressions Terrorism and Terrorist . . . have always had a pejorative 
connotation.  In other words, these expressions are used in order to oppose someone or something and to justify this 
opposition.”) (emphasis in original).
108  See, e.g., Sciullo, supra note 20, at 336 (“Describing a person as a terrorist kills that individual and gives birth to a 
new subjectivity: the Terrorist.”); Acharya, supra note 107, at 655 (“In the absence of  a definition of  [terrorism], there 
is a free and open tendency for the persons using the term, whether states, organized groups or scholars, to define it as 
suits their purposes at the moment.”). Collins & Glover, supra note 102, at 165 (“What distinguishes ‘terrorism’ from 
other acts of  political violence, of  course, depends on who is doing the defining.”); 
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cited cliché: “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.”109
It thus follows that a sovereign’s declaration of  war on an indefinable abstraction like terrorism 
begs for concretization and contextualization.  Consider a traditional war fought on a traditional 
battlefield: the enemy army is generally uniformed and clearly defined, as are the battlefield borders. 
In the chaos of  conflict, a traditional war is — to some degree — predictable.  But the war on terror 
provides few markers and little predictability.110  Who is the enemy?111  If  it is al-Qaeda, how do we 
identify a member of  al-Qaeda?112  Where does al-Qaeda operate?113  Do sovereign borders in fact 
confine al-Qaeda?114  Are its self-professed affiliates also enemies?115  The responding military neces-
sarily demands the parameters of  the conflict, and the fearful public insists on knowing the contours 
of  the threat.  Threat rhetoric then permeates the gaps that the absence of  a single definition of  ter-
rorism creates, providing the concretization and contextualization necessary to wage the war.
Threat rhetoric is the language employed by the sovereign — the Executive — to identify and 
communicate to the citizenry the internal and external threats to the homeland.116  Notwithstand-
ing the absence of  traditional markers of  conflict in the war on terror, the citizenry looks to the 
109  Gerald Seymour, harrY’S game (1975); see also Begorre-Bret, supra note 95, at 1992 (“To say that one person’s 
terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter is perhaps a cliché, . . . [b]ut it manifests the semantic problem caused by 
the indexical nature of  the word ‘terrorism.’ . . .  When somebody uses the word ‘terrorism,’ he takes a stand in a friend/
enemy relation of  a Schmittian type.”). 
110  But see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 harv. l. 
rev. 2047, 2068 (2005) (arguing that “despite its novel features, the post-September 11 war on terrorism possesses more 
characteristics of  a traditional war than some commentators have acknowledged”).
111  See generally id., at 2107-16 (discussing which organizations and entities are covered by AUMF); Joseph I. 
Lieberman, Who’s the Enemy in the War on Terror?, wall St. J. (June 15, 2010), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB
10001424052748703509404575300420668558244.html (arguing that the declared enemy in the war on terror should be 
violent Islamic extremism rather than a specific organization). 
112  See generally Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against Al-Qaeda, 47 tex. int’l l.J. 1 
(2011); Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Held? Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C.l.rev. 769 (2011); David 
Mortlock, Definite Detention: The Scope of  the President’s Authority to Detain Enemy Combatants, 4 harv. l. & POl’Y rev. 375 
(2010); Thomas J. Bogar, Unlawful Combatant or Innocent Civilian? A Call to Change the Current Means for Determining Status of  
Prisoners in the Global War on Terror, 21 fla. J. int’l l. 29 (2009); Matthew C. Waxman, Administrative Detention of  Terrorist: 
Why Detain, and Detain Whom?, 3 J. nat’l SeCuritY l. & POl’Y 1 (2009). 
113  See generally Blank, supra note 3.
114  See generally id.
115  See generally Bardley & Goldsmith, supra note 110.
116  See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 
62 haStingS l.J. 1441, 1480 (2011) (“[R]ecent work on the history of  emergencies indicates that, far from being a 
temporary divergence from a background of  normality, the rhetoric of  emergency has regularly punctuated recent 
national discussions of  both internal and external threats to order and security.  In short, threat rhetoric has burrowed 
so deep into the fabric of  our society that it may be impossible to dislodge.”); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, 
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 minn. l. rev. 1789, 1850 (2010) (discussing the politics of  
emergency and arguing that “the President and his supporters repeatedly use emergency rhetoric to shore up public 
support or distract attention from failed policies”).
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Executive to identify, describe, and respond to threats.117  Like terrorism, threat rhetoric is in part 
performative: while it may describe an actual threat to some degree, threat rhetoric also performs the 
function of  identifying the enemy and shaping the conflict.118
Threat rhetoric is particularly powerful in the war on terror because our collective conceptualiza-
tion of  “security” has shifted dramatically since the early-to-mid twentieth century from a personal 
“democratic security” to a collective “national security.”119  As Aziz Rana describes, before World 
War II security was understood as the protection of  individual property and well-being.120  Draw-
ing on the philosophies of  John Locke, it followed that individuals possessed the knowledge and 
reasoning necessary to best look after their own security. 121  Based on that collective knowledge, the 
institutions and policies employed in the interests of  security were largely relegated to the “people” 
as democratic matters — hence, “democratic security.”122  Democratic security emphasized transpar-
ency and civilian control and deemphasized secrecy and expertization.123  In other words, the people 
— collectively — were capable of  discerning what was best for their own security. 
 Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, against the backdrop of  economic collapse, 
industrialization, and the New Deal, the complexities of  the new century became clear: ordinary 
citizens no longer understood the controlling forces nor possessed the capacity to provide for their 
own well being.124  The United States faced numerous new external threats — threats to the home-
117  See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 45, at 27 (“In essence, if  the public cannot assess the war based on traditional 
evaluations and causal events such as gained territory or destroyed targets, they then look to the leader for that 
evaluation.”); Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of  Law in Crisis: The Lessons We Should Have Learned from the War on 
Drugs, 36 S. ill. u. l.J. 1, 3 (2011) (“Citizens of  this country tend not to carefully analyze those claim [of  threat rhetoric] 
so long as we are frightened sufficiently by those we are supposed to trust and in whom we have imposed the trust of  
our national safety and security.”).
118  Austin, supra note 105 and accompanying text; see also Brown, supra note 15, at 659-60 (arguing that drug 
trafficking only became a “national security threat” when President Reagan labeled it as such). 
119  See generally Aziz Rana, Who Decides on Security?, 44 COnn. l. rev. 1417 (2012).
120  Id. at 1423 (“[T]roughout most of  the American experience, the dominant ideological perspective saw security as 
grounded in protecting citizens from threats to their property and physical well-being”).
121  Id.
122  Id. (“A widespread knowledge of  security needs was presumed to be embedded in social experience, indicating 
that citizens had the skill to take part in democratic discussion regarding how best to protect their property or to 
respond to forms of  external violence.”); see also Aziz Rana, Responses to the Ten Questions, 37 wm. mitChell l. rev. 5099, 
5103 (2011). 
123  Rana, supra note 119, at 1451 (“Presumptions against both secrecy and heightened bureaucracy were believed to 
be necessary for curtailing the ability of  centralized actors — particularly Executive officials and military personnel — to 
make unilateral judgments about defense and emergency.”).
124  Id. at 1453 (“[I]n the past, the U.S. was primarily a society of  independent homesteaders and artisans.  This meant 
that individuals and families were often self-sufficient, and that as long as they had access to property or the tools of  
a trade, they could ensure their own material survival.  By contrast, the rise of  industrial wage labor and salaried work 
meant that individuals no longer controlled their own fortunes.”).
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land.125  The external threats were complex: they were foreign, and they required specialized experts 
to gather and analyze intelligence from abroad.126  The threats required shifting the U.S. foreign 
policy focus from diplomacy to military affairs.127  
The new conceptualization of  security — national security — could no longer be governed 
democratically.128  While ordinary citizens may have been capable of  deciding matters of  their own 
personal security, they no longer held the capacity to decide matters of  national security. 129  Demo-
cratic deliberation on national security matters, it was thought, “would only lead to conflict and to 
decision-making driven by special interests rather than those with actual knowledge about social 
conditions.”130  Thus, the notion of  transparency and public decision-making fell away and was 
replaced by a growing industry of  government experts bound by secrecy.131  “National security” be-
came something “pre-political”132 and removed from democracy — an all-encompassing, “unifying 
commitment [that] transcended ordinary popular disagreement and thus was appropriately removed 
from the regular political process.”133 
This commitment to secrecy and the “non-democratic” nature of  national security policy is pre-
cisely why threat rhetoric is effective.  With no check on the veracity or reliability of  the intelligence 
and information guiding decision-making, the Executive is free to control the substantive informa-
tion and its presentation — to shape the rhetoric.  The flexibility and lack of  accountability permit 
the Executive to shape the information, not to reflect an actual threat, but to fit policy goals.
125  Id. at 1453-54; see also Rana, supra note 122, at 5104 (“[T]he rise of  totalitarian regimes meant that the United 
States now faced external enemies that, due to ideology, could not be deterred in the same way as old European rivals.  
Moreover, technological improvements — especially the rise of  air power — indicated that the United States was 
no longer safe behind the oceans.”); see also Laura 1654 (“[D]emocratic countries were losing ground to authoritarian 
regimes, which were more effective at exploiting new technologies.”).
126  Rana, supra note 119, at 1453-54.
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 1464-65 (explaining that national security powers such as intelligence gathering, technological development, 
and military preparedness should be centralized and insulated in the Executive Branch because the ordinary citizen was 
increasingly incapable of  understanding the global political arena); see also Brown, supra note 15, at 655 (noting that World 
War I marked “turning point” for America toward militarization, “taking a major and seemingly irrevocable step in the 
direction of  becoming a warfare or national security state”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129  Rana, supra note 119, at 1464 (“While individuals had an interest in their own physical protection, they had limited 
capacities to gauge the seriousness or immediacy of  potential dangers [to national security].”).
130  Id. at 1440.
131  Id. at 1464-65 (“[But of  significant importance was a] focus on secrecy and a rejection of  old presumptions in 
favor of  political transparency and public access.  In order to respond to threats from abroad, the state needed to remain 
one step ahead of  its potential enemies.  This required developing a new formalized network of  spies as well as linguistic 
and technological experts skilled in collecting and sifting through intelligence.”). 
132  Id. at 1465 (“[I]f  a balance between liberty and security must be struck, security had to enjoy primacy of  place as 
both pre-political and the foundation of  American unity.”).
133  Id.; see also id. at 1423-24 (“Insulated decision-makers in the Executive Branch, armed with the specialized skills 
of  the professional military, are assumed to be best equipped to make sense of  complicated and often conflicted 
information about safety and self-defense.”).
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B.  Threat Rhetoric and the Iraq War
In no other recent era was the efficacy of  threat rhetoric to garner support for a literal war 
clearer than in the months before the 2003 invasion of  Iraq.134  Through speeches, interviews, 
congressional briefings, and public documents, the Bush administration’s threat rhetoric involved 
hundreds of  claims regarding Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime’s possession of  biological and 
chemical weapons and, quite simply, the general threat that Iraq posed to the United States.  Coupled 
with ominous images of  mushroom clouds and a vial of  anthrax brandished by then-Secretary of  
State Colin Powell at a United Nations Security Council speech,135 the Executive sought to link Iraq 
to the war on terror,136 thereby instilling fear in the public137 and convincing Congress that the use 
134  See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Bush, Obama and Beyond: Observations on the Prospect of  Fact Checking Executive 
Department Threat Claims Before the Use of  Force, 26 COnSt. COmment. 433, 436 (2010)  (“In the year before the Iraq War, 
President Bush, in combination with others in his Administration, used threat claims as the primary component of  a 
strategic and coordinated communications campaign to build consent to his policy choice to use force.”).
135  See Secretary of  State Colin Powell, Address to the United Nations Security Council (Feb. 5, 2003) (transcript 
available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/05/sprj.irq.powell.transcript.05/index.html); see also Steven R. Weisman, 
Powell Calls His U.N. Speech a Lasting Blot on His Record, N.Y. timeS (Sept. 9, 2005)  available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2005/09/09/politics/09powell.html?_r=0. 
136  E.g., President’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1572, 1576 
(Sept. 12, 2002) (“If  the Iraqi regime wishes peace, it will immediately end all support for terrorism and act to suppress 
it.”); President’s Radio Address, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1582, 1583 (Sept. 14, 2002) (“Saddam Hussein’s regime continues to 
support terrorist groups and to oppress its civilian population.”); President’s Radio Address, 2. PuB. PaPerS 1696, 1696 
(Sept. 28, 2002) (“The [Iraqi] regime has longstanding and continuing ties to terrorist groups, and there are Al Qaida 
terrorists inside Iraq.”); President’s Remarks Announcing Bipartisan Agreement on Joint Resolution to Authorize the 
Use of  United States Armed Forces Against Iraq, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1707, 1707-08 (Oct. 2, 2002) (“On its present course, 
the Iraqi regime is a threat of  unique urgency.  We know the treacherous history of  the regime.  It has waged war on its 
neighbors.  It has sponsored and sheltered terrorists. . . . Countering Iraq’s threat is also a central commitment on the war on 
terror.”) (emphasis added); President’s Radio Address, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1735, 1736 (Oct. 5, 2002) (“Iraq has longstanding 
ties to terrorist groups.”); President’s Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 2 PuB. PaPerS 1751, 1753 
(Oct. 7, 2002) (“We know that Iraq and the Al Qaida terrorist network share a common enemy — the United States of  
America.  We know that Iraq and Al Qaida have had high-level contacts that go back a decade.  Some Al Qaida leaders 
who fled to Afghanistan went to Iraq.  . . . We’ve learned that Iraq has trained Al Qaida members in bombmaking and 
poisons and deadly gases.  And we know that after September the 11th, Saddam Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the 
terrorist attacks on America. . . . Saddam Hussein is harboring terrorists and the instruments of  terror, the instruments 
of  mass death and destruction.”); President’s Radio Address, 2 PuB. PaPerS 2080, 2080-81 (Nov. 16, 2002 (“To win the 
war on terror, we’re also opposing the growing threat of  weapons of  mass destruction in the hands of  outlaw regimes 
[like Iraq].”); President’s Radio Address, 2 Pub. Papers 2170, 2170-71 (Dec. 7, 2002) (“Disarming [the Iraqi] regime is a 
central commitment of  the war on terror.”); President’s Radio Address, 2 PuB. PaPerS 2214, 2214 (Dec. 28, 2002) (“The 
war on terror also requires us to confront the danger of  catastrophic violence posed by Iraq and its weapons of  mass 
destruction.”); President’s Address Before a Joint Session of  the Congress on the State of  the Union, 1 PuB. PaPerS 
82,89  (Jan. 28, 2003) (“Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and statements by people now in 
custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of  Al Qaida.”).   
137  Wolfe, supra note 45, at 27 (noting that war and public opinion are directly correlated, such that presidents now 
often address the public directly to garner support for war, rather than Congress) (citations omitted).
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of  force in Iraq “was a necessity[,] not a choice”138 — that is, that the battlefield in the war on terror 
must extend to Iraq. 
Briefly, the threat rhetoric progressed as follows: In September 2002, President Bush claimed 
before the United Nations General Assembly that Iraq possessed weapons of  mass destruction and 
that the Saddam Hussein regime posed a “grave and gathering danger” 139 and a “threat to peace.”140  
Thereafter, the terrorism theme of  the threat rhetoric — necessary to link Iraq to the war on 
terror,141 which already enjoyed public support — dominated presidential discourse.142  At that early 
point, a majority of  the public believed that the President should get the approval of  Congress, the 
UN, Western allies and Arab states before confronting the threat with force.143  By President Bush’s 
State of  the Union Address in late January 2003, however, just five months later, public opinion 
echoed the Executive’s position — that the use of  force via military action in Iraq was necessary.144  
And by early March 2003, a majority of  the public was persuaded that toppling the Hussein regime 
was necessary and worth the loss of  troops.145  
We now know that the threats were false,146 but at the time the threat rhetoric worked.147  In just 
half  a year, the Executive had convinced more than half  the American public and Congress148 that 
138  Jacobs, supra note 135, at 438 (citations omitted) (explaining that the administration accomplished this by 
representing the threat Iraq posed as imminent and possibly directed within the United States). 
139  President’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, supra note 137, at 1575.
140  Id. 
141  Legally, the war in Iraq enjoyed congressional authorization distinct from the authorization for the use of  force 
against al-Qaeda.  Compare Authorization for Use of  Military Force Against Iraq, PuB. l. nO. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 
(2002) (authorizing military force against Iraq) with Authorization for Use of  Military Force, PuB. l. nO. 107-40, 115 
Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing force against the nations, organizations, or persons responsible for the terrorist attacks 
on September 11, 2001).  The contention here is not that linking Iraq to the war on terror was legally necessary, but that 
it was necessary to garner public support.  A nation reeling from the September 11 terrorist attacks was more likely to 
collectively support retaliation for the attacks and against “terrorism” and “terrorists” generally, rather than preemptive 
action against a foreign regime.  See, e.g., Wolfe, supra note 29, at 65-66 (arguing that the Iraq threat rhetoric was framed 
along a terrorism theme because the public was more likely to accept an invasion designed to prevent further losses, 
rather than an invasion intended to procure future gains).  That is not to say, however, that in actuality the invasion of  
Iraq was not a preemptive strike. 
142  Supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also Wolfe, supra note 45, at 68–69, 79–80.
143  Galip Isen, Discourse of  Evil: Speaking Terrorism to Silence, reCOnStruCtiOn (2006), http://reconstruction.eserver.
org/033/isen.htm. 
144  Id. (contending that President Bush successfully convinced the public through his State of  the Union address).
145  Id.; see also Public Attitudes Toward the War in Iraq: 2003-2008, Pew Research Center (Mar. 19, 2008), http://
www.pewresearch.org/2008/03/19/public-attitudes-toward-the-war-in-iraq-20032008/; Lloyd De Vries, Poll: U.S. Backs 
Bush on War, CBS News, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500160_162-545009.html. 
146  See S. reP. nO. 109-331 (2006). 
147  See, e.g., Isen, supra note 144 (“[T]he drift of  intellectual concentration and political discussion visibly turned from 
acts of  terror to open and out warfare against Afghanistan and Iraq as sponsor states of  terrorism while shifts of  public 
opinion manifested an impressive parallel with government rhetoric and policy.”). 
148  Jacobs, supra note 135, at 439 (“The Report of  the House Committee on International Relations explained that 
it embraced the Executive Branch’s factual assertions about the Iraq threat and based its recommendation that the body 
vote to authorize the use of  force upon it.”) (citation omitted). 
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the national security danger of  Iraq demanded a military response.  Indeed, the rhetoric was so pow-
erful that some congressional members who had initially been reluctant to authorize the use of  force 
eventually “explained their votes in favor as based on their belief  that the threat claims advocated 
by the executive department were true.”149  And even after knowing that the threats were false, the 
public still believed that the United States is more secure without Saddam Hussein in power.150
The Executive crafted the Iraq threat rhetoric with particularly heavy reliance on our modern 
conception of  security and its primacy on expertise and secrecy.  Controlling the sources and meth-
ods of  intelligence collection151 and then carefully selecting the information that was disseminated 
publicly,152 the Bush administration shaped and colored its threat rhetoric to contextualize the inde-
finable war on terror, instill fear in public, and justify extending the geographic scope of  the battle-
field.  The war on terror had arrived in Iraq.153  
C.  Threat Rhetoric and Homegrown Terrorism
The Bush administration’s threat rhetoric leading up to the invasion of  Iraq was carefully de-
signed and executed to garner public support for the war and congressional consent for the use of  
force or extending the geographic scope of  the battlefield in the war on terror to Iraq.  The Obama 
administration is employing similar threat rhetoric surrounding the purported danger of  al-Qaeda-
recruited extremists within the United States known as “homegrown terrorists.”  Echoed loudly by 
some congressional members,154 the Executive’s homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric is directed 
to the public to garner support for increasingly intrusive counterterrorism policies and tactics in 
the United States — that is, extending the geographic scope of  the battlefield to the homeland and 
bringing characteristics of  the war paradigm within our borders. 
Although whispers of  rhetoric from the Executive concerning the homegrown terrorism threat 
149  Id. 
150  Isen, supra note 144.
151  Jacobs, supra note 135, at 446 (“At the very least, members of  the Bush Administration did not encourage the 
independent and thorough intelligen[ce] gathering and analysis that can be expected to produce the most accurate 
threat assessments.  . . . Instead, executive department officials, particularly the Vice President, aggressively prodded 
intelligence analysts to discover information and provide threat assessments that would substantiate threat claims and 
support the use of  force.”). 
152  Id. at 443–44 (“The President and his top officials relied on controlled information release in a number of  wars to 
support their use of  force advocacy.  . . . They selectively released pieces of  raw intelligence that supported their claims, 
without disclosing that intelligence experts disagreed about whether the evidence was significant or whether its source 
was credible.  They did not release raw intelligence or intelligence community assessments that undercut their argument 
that Iraq presented an immediate threat.”) (citations omitted).  
153  Id., at 437 (describing that the administration repeatedly asserted as fact that Iraq had the weapons capabilities 
to immediately attack both its neighbors and the United States, was inclined to attack these countries, and was offering 
support to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda). 
154  See Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 America, 47 gOnz. l.rev. 429, 
483-86 (2011) (discussing Rep. Peter King’s 2011 congressional hearings on homegrown terrorism). 
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began around 2006,155 the homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric has increased significantly since 
2010.156  The rhetoric focuses on the perceived threat of  al-Qaeda and its affiliates “reaching into” 
the U.S. to recruit and radicalize American Muslims.157  For instance, in 2010 Director of  National 
Intelligence Dennis Blair warned that influential members of  al-Qaeda and its affiliates “will increas-
ingly motivate individuals toward violent extremism.”158  In a speech to Muslim communities in 
March 2011, Denis McDonough, Deputy National Security Advisor, warned that “al Qaeda and its 
adherent have increasingly turned to another troubling thematic: attempting to recruit and radical-
ize people to terrorism here in the United States.”159  And in language harkening back to the grand 
rhetoric of  the Bush administration immediately after September 11, McDonough warned, “For a 
long time, many in the U.S. thought that our unique melting pot meant we were immune from this 
threat.  . . . That was false hope, and false comfort.  This threat is real, and it is serious.”160  
The Executive perceived this threat to be so serious that in late 2011, President Obama launched 
the White House’s official strategy to combat homegrown terrorism.161  Entitled the “Strategic 
Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States,”162 the plan is premised on the notion of  “[p]rotecting American communities from al-
155  For instance, in 2006 FBI Director Meuller stated, “Today, terrorist threats may come from smaller, more loosely-
defined individuals and cells who are not affiliated with al Qaeda, but who are inspired by a violent jihadist message.  
These homegrown terrorists may prove to be as dangerous as groups like al Qaeda, if  not more so.”  Robert S. Mueller, 
Director, Fed. Bureau of  Investigation, The Threat of  Homegrown Terrorism, Speech at The City Club of  Cleveland 
(June 23, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-of-homegrown-terrorism.   
156  See Glenn Greenwald, The Grave Threat of  “Homegrown Terrorism”, SalOn (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:51 AM), http://
www.salon.com/2012/02/08/the_grave_threat_of_homegrown_terrorism/ (detailing statements from Executive 
Branch officials concerning homegrown terrorism threat since 2010).  The infamous 2007 report by the New York 
Police Department concerning “radicalization of  the west” and the FBI’s 2006 report regarding the “radicalization 
process” may have provided the unofficial roadmap for the official homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric.  See New 
York City Police Dep’t, radiCalizatiOn in the weSt: the hOmegrOwn threat (2007), http://www.nypdshield.org/
public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf; Federal Bureau of  Investigation, the 
radiCalizatiOn PrOCeSS: frOm COnverSiOn tO Jihad (2006), available at http://cryptome.org/fbi-jihad.pdf. 
157  See Greenwald, supra note 157 (providing examples of  rhetoric involving the mention of  “homegrown terrorists”).
158  Annual Threat Assessment of  the U.S. Intelligence Community for the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence, OffiCe Of the dir. Of nat’l intelligenCe 11 (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100203_
testimony.pdf; see also Gordon Lubold, Homegrown terrorism a growing concern for US intelligence, ChriStian SCi. mOnitOr (Feb. 
4, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/0204/Homegrown-terrorism-a-growing-concern-for-US-intelligence 
(reporting that Blair told the Senate that “the threat to the homeland from Americans with links to radicals abroad 
remains troubling”). 
159  Denis McDonough, Deputy Nat’l Security Advisor to the President, “Partnering with Communities to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in America” (Mar. 6, 2011) (prepared remarks available at white hOuSe, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2011/03/06/remarks-denis-mcdonough-deputy-national-security-advisor-president-prepa (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2012)). 
160  Id. 
161  See, e.g., Dina Temple-Raston, Officials Detail Plans to Fight Homegrown Terrorism, NPR (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.
npr.org/2011/12/08/143319965/officials-detail-plans-to-fight-terrorism-at-home. 
162  Press Release, Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 
white hOuSe (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/08/strategic-implementation-plan-
empowering-local-partners-prevent-violent-. 
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Qa’ida’s hateful ideology” and, specifically, protecting Muslim Americans’ “sons and daughters from 
al-Qa’ida’s murderous ideology.”163  The administration recognizes that “violent extremism in Amer-
ica is nothing new” and that many ideologically variant groups “have engaged in horrific violence to 
kill our citizens and threaten our way of  life,”164 but its rhetoric focuses exclusively on the danger of  
al-Qaeda, the enemy in and focal point of  the war on terror. 
The Obama administration’s threat rhetoric concerning homegrown terrorism, like the Bush ad-
ministration’s rhetoric leading up to the invasion of  Iraq, is carefully designed: the language is consis-
tently anchored to al-Qaeda and the group’s efforts to recruit and radicalize Americans.  Anchoring 
the rhetoric to al-Qaeda ensures a mere extension of  the war on terror.  And even in the face of  evi-
dence that the actual homegrown terrorism threat is not as dire as purported,165 the rhetoric has not 
diminished.166  The Executive is defining, shaping, and coloring a perceived threat to the homeland 
to garner public support for the use of  force against individuals far from the battlefield of  Afghani-
stan — in the United States.167  In other words, where al-Qaeda goes, the battlefield grows.  
D.  The “Legitimacy Deficit” and Judicial Deference
The shift in our collective conception of  security described above — from personal security to 
national security — has created a self-perceived legitimacy deficit in the Judiciary.168  From executive 
expertise and secrecy — the hallmarks of  modern national security — grew a tradition of  judicial 
deference to the Executive that “pervades the area of  national security.”169  Now more than a decade 
after September 11, 2001, the “new national security canon”170 that has grown out of  an increas-
ingly deferential stance before the Executive on national security matters risks establishing national 
security policy as “an area over which the political branches exercise near-plenary control.”171  In the 
163  Id.
164  Id. 
165  See, e.g., Charles Kurzman, Muslim-American Terrorism in the Decade Since 9/11, triangle Center On terrOriSm and 
hOmeland SeCuritY (2012); Scott Shane, Radical U.S. Muslims Little Threat, Study Says, n.Y. timeS, Feb. 7, 2012, at A10, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/us/radical-muslim-americans-pose-little-threat-study-says.html?_
r=1&hp (“Charles Kurzman, the author of  the report for the Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 
called terrorism by Muslim Americans ‘a miniscule threat to public safety.’”); Greenwald, supra note 157.  
166  See, e.g., U.S. News Staff, Homegrown Terrorism Attacks Still Cause for Alarm Among Intelligence Officials, u.S. newS 
(June 26, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/dotmil/2012/06/26/homegrown-terrorism-attacks-still-cause-
for-alarm-among-intelligence-officals (reporting NCTC Director Olsen recently “spent ample time discussing the 
burgeoning homegrown terrorism threat”). 
167  Id.
168  Rana, supra note 119, at 1424; Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 u. Chi. l. rev. 865, 
891 (2007) (“Aroused publics concerned about issues such as national security sometimes have little tolerance for robust 
judicial oversight of  executive discretion, which can always be condemned as ‘activism’ by ‘unelected judges.’  This 
charge sometimes succeeds and sometimes fails, but for the judges [the legitimacy deficit] is always a concern that acts as 
a drag on attempts to monitor executive behavior.”). 
169  Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 818 (1992). 
170  See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The New National Security Canon, 61 am. u. l. rev. 1295 (2012).
171  Id. at 1300. 
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absence of  judicial scrutiny over national security policy matters, particularly those as fundamental 
as the geographic scope of  the battlefield in the war on terror, the Executive harbors substantial 
latitude to shape and define the conflict, making a truly “global” battlefield less of  an overstatement 
and more of  a reality. 
The Judiciary has internalized a self-perceived legitimacy deficit.172  As explained above, the 
modern notion of  national security conceptualizes the citizenry as incapable of  making democratic 
policy choices in the best interests of  national security because the citizenry does not possess the 
knowledge or the capacity to do so.173   Likewise, where matters of  security expertise and secrecy are 
invoked, the Judiciary often perceives itself  as ill equipped and incapable of  scrutinizing Executive 
security decisions.174  “Today, a central feature of  American legal and political life is the pervasive 
tendency of  courts to tread lightly with respect to [E]xecutive [B]ranch determinations of  external 
threat.”175  Where security expertise is invoked, courts have been increasingly unwilling to inter-
cede.176  
Notwithstanding the courts’ initial reluctance after September 11, 2001 to accept the Executive’s 
conceptualization of  a worldwide war fought on a global battlefield,177 the Judiciary’s self-perceived 
legitimacy deficit is leading to increased deference to the Executive as more matters of  national 
security reach the courts.178  From habeas review for men detained at Guantanamo Bay179 to the 
justiciability of  a targeted killing in Yemen180 to accountability for torture of  a U.S. citizen in a U.S. 
detention facility,181 the federal Judiciary’s confidence in its ability to inquire and scrutinize Execu-
tive policies on national security matters has waned significantly.  Within the new national security 
canon, courts have altogether avoided confronting the issue of  the geographic scope of  the battle-
172  Rana, supra note 119, at 1469-70 (“At first glance, this fact is rather surprising, given the common image of  the 
courts as an all-knowing and elevated priesthood.  Yet, the clear trend in recent decades has been the steady reduction 
in judicial confidence to intercede where security expertise is invoked.  . . . Such a reduction in confidence underscores 
how judges have come to see themselves as trapped in the same law position of  uncertainty as ordinary citizens and — 
therefore like the public writ large — ill equipped to intervene in matters of  security.” (internal citations omitted)). 
173  Id. at 1423.
174  Id. at 1469-70.
175  Id. 
176  Id. 
177  Id.
178  See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 170 (arguing that ten years of  post-September 11 jurisprudence has created a new 
national security canon, under which (1) the political branches now possess near-plenary control over national security 
policy and (2) the state of  exception is normalizing). 
179  See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SetOn hall l. rev. 1451 (2011). 
180  Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp.2d 1 (2010).
181  Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 551 (4th Cir. 2012) cert. denied (2012) (“In short, Padilla’s complaint seeks 
quite candidly to have the judiciary review and disapprove sensitive military decisions made after extensive deliberations 
within the executive branch as to what the law permitted, what national security required, and how best to reconcile 
competing values.  It takes little enough imagination to understand that a judicially devised damages action would 
expose past executive deliberations affective sensitive matters of  national security to the prospect of  searching judicial 
scrutiny.”). 
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field.182  As cases involving the Executive’s use of  force in locales far removed from Afghanistan are 
presented, courts nearly inevitably dismiss or decide the matter on grounds that fail to address the 
battlefield issue.
Of  particular importance for purposes of  the geographic scope of  the battlefield is Al-Aulaqi 
v. Obama, in which plaintiffs challenged the Executive’s use of  force — specifically, a program of  
targeted killings by drones — in Yemen.183  The plaintiff, Nasser Al-Aulaqi, sought to challenge 
the Executive’s alleged authorized killing of  his son, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, by drone strike in Yemen.184  
Anwar Al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen, was185 labeled a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in 2010 on 
allegations that he was “acting for or on behalf  of  al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and 
providing financial, material or technological support for, or other services to or in support of, acts 
of  terrorism.”186  Al-Aulaqi was believed to have “taken on an increasingly operational role in AQAP 
since late 2009,” and public sources reported that he had ties to Farouk Abdulmutallab187 and Nidal 
Malik Hasan.188  Nasser Al-Aulaqi, Anwar’s father, based his belief  that his son was on a “kill list” on 
media reports citing anonymous military and intelligence sources.189  Among the reports, The Wash-
ington Post stated in early 2010 that, according to an anonymous U.S. official, Al-Aulaqi was the “first 
U.S. citizen added to a list of  suspected terrorists the CIA is authorized to kill.”190  
Judge Bates dismissed the suit on a number of  grounds, including a finding that the case pre-
sented a non-justiciable political question — the ultimate form of  judicial deference to the Execu-
tive.191  Despite recognizing that the issues raised by the case are “of  great public interest,”192 Bates 
held that resolution of  the case would require the court to decide a number of  questions more aptly 
reserved for the Executive, including “whether AQAP and al Qaeda are so closely linked to the 
[government’s] targeted killing of  Anwar Al-Aulaqi in Yemen [to] come within the United States’s 
182  See generally Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the case regarding the targeting 
killing of  an American in Yemen based on the court’s finding that the case presented a non-justiciable political question).
183  Id. at 9, 10. 
184  Id. at 9.
185  The past tense is used here because Anwar Al-Aulaqi was killed by U.S. drone strike in September 2011.  See Mark 
Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt, and Robert F. Worth, “Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing of  Awlaki in Yemen,” n.Y. timeS, 
Oct. 1, 2011, at 1A, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-
yemen.html?pagewanted=all (“After several days of  surveillance of  Mr. Awlaki, armed drones operated by the Central 
Intelligence Agency took off  from a new, secret American base in the Arabian Peninsula, crossed into northern Yemen 
and unleashed a barrage of  Hellfire missiles at a car carrying him and other top operatives from Al Qaeda’s branch in 
Yemen.”). 
186  727 F. Supp.2d at 10.
187  Associated Press, Abdulmutallab handed life sentence, guardian (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:42 PM), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2012/feb/16/underwear-bomber-sentenced-life-prison.
188  Brian Ross, How Anwar Al-Awlaki Inspired Terror From Across the Globe, aBC wOrld newS, (Sept. 30, 2011), 
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/anwar-al-awlaki-inspired-terror/story?id=14643383#.UIPdII6I2fE.
189  727 F. Supp.2d at 11.
190  Id.  
191  See id. at 8–9, 46 (“[P]laintiff ’s claims pose precisely the types of  complex policy questions that the D.C. Circuit 
has historically held non-justiciable under the political question doctrine.”).
192  Id. at 9.
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current armed conflict with al Qaeda.”193  In other words, the court declined to address whether the 
geographic scope of  the battlefield extends to Yemen — a state thousands of  miles from Afghani-
stan — in an exercise of  substantial deference to the Executive.  
Jose Padilla’s civil lawsuit similarly raised issues of  the geographic scope of  the battlefield, which 
the Fourth Circuit declined to examine.  Padilla, a U.S. citizen, and his mother, Estela Lebron, sued 
for declaratory relief  and damages based on Padilla’s 2002 arrest on U.S. soil and his military deten-
tion as an “enemy combatant” in the South Carolina naval brigade.194  The court specifically noted 
that Padilla’s claims of  abuse and torture against the high-level Executive Branch defendants sought 
to impose liability “for developing the global detention and interrogation policies that he contends 
were unconstitutional.”195  The “global detention and interrogation policies” were those developed 
under the authorization for the use of  force — that is, under the war paradigm. 
Presented squarely with the question of  whether the Executive’s war power authority extends to 
actions taken in the United States, the court refused to face the issue.  Instead, the court affirmed 
the dismissal of  Padilla’s suit, declining to recognize a cause of  action for Padilla’s claims under the 
Bivens doctrine.196  Relying on the “special factors” exception to Bivens claims, the court held that 
deference to the political branches on “military affairs” precluded judicial review of  enemy combat-
ant detentions,197 seemingly regardless of  where they occur.  Moreover, invoking the self-perceived 
legitimacy deficit, the court found that “judicial review of  military decisions would stray from the 
traditional subjects of  judicial competence.”198
Eric Holder was certainly correct in his assertion that “neither Congress nor our federal courts 
has limited the geographic scope of  our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”199 
But failing to exact such scrutiny provides the Executive with near-unchecked latitude to shape the 
battlefield and the power to dictate where the war paradigm operates.  And when the battlefield in-
cludes the United States, a necessary consequence of  a truly “global” war, characteristics of  the war 
paradigm follow. 
iv.  imPliCatiOnS Of a wOrldwide war On a glOBal Battlefield: militarizatiOn Of State 
and lOCal law enfOrCement
When the Executive operates within a global war paradigm, unrestrained by the Judiciary, the 
geographic scope of  the battlefield necessarily extends to the homeland.  The carefully crafted 
homegrown terrorism threat rhetoric and the Judiciary’s increasing deference discussed in Part III 
combine to create the perfect storm with which to bring the battlefield within U.S. borders — to 
193  Id. at 46.
194  Lebron, 670 F.3d at 544. 
195  Id. at 547. 
196  Id. at 547–48.
197  Id. at 549. (“[J]udicial deference is the Constitution’s parallel commitment of  command responsibility in national 
security and military affairs to the President as Commander in Chief.”) (citations omitted). 
198  Id. at 548. 
199  See supra Section II.B.
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“Battlefield Main Street”200 — and with the battlefield comes characteristics of  the war paradigm.201  
Importing characteristics of  the war paradigm into domestic activities is troubling because it 
occurs quietly and incrementally, thereby evading widespread public attention and scrutiny.202  In the 
absence of  both judicial and public scrutiny, there is a substantial risk that those war paradigm char-
acteristics will become entrenched and normalized, thereby transforming them from the temporary 
requirements of  exigency to the permanent practices of  the routine.203 
One disturbing aspect of  extending the war paradigm into the United States is the increasing 
militarization of  state and local law enforcement and the risk that the militarization will become 
entrenched in our culture — fundamentally shifting our collective conception of  law enforcement’s 
role toward and relationship with citizens and communities.204  From acquiring military-grade equip-
ment to adopting war-like tactics and behaviors, the militarization of  state and local law enforcement 
disrupts the apt historical division between law enforcement and military activities in the U.S. and, 
accordingly, threatens to transform police departments from agencies designed to protect and serve 
the public to military units designed to quickly identify and eliminate enemies.205  With this transfor-
mation, we risk eroding many of  the fundamental constitutional protections embodied within the 
criminal law paradigm.
A. Historically Distinct Boundaries 
The American ethos has historically drawn a distinct line between the military and civilian law 
enforcement — between war and peacetime.206  “Soldiers, after all, go to war to destroy, and kill the 
enemy.  The police, who are supposed to maintain the peace, ‘are the citizens, and the citizens are 
200  Benjamin Carlson, Battlefield Main Street, the dailY (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.thedaily.com/
page/2011/12/05/120511-news-militarized-police-1-6/. 
201  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 128, at 658 (describing martial rhetoric which “worked to militarize the whole of  
American society to the war paradigm.”). 
202  See Stuart, supra note 117, at 5 (“We as a people tend not to be very reflective about the truth underlying those 
claims or the wisdom of  the actions we are asked to take because war ‘is an enticing elixir.’”) (citation omitted). 
203  See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 172, at 1300 (discussing “normalization of  the exception” as “the accommodation 
into existing law of  practices and policies typically embraced only by virtue of  their exigency and fleeting duration.”) 
(internal citations omitted).
204  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 128, at 658 (“Most certainly, the ‘war on terror’ has proved to be an unprecedented 
contributor to America’s militarization and, some would argue, digression toward militarism.”).
205  See, e.g., Justin Elliott, How the feds fueled the militarization of  police, SalOn (Dec. 24, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://
www.salon.com/2011/12/24/how_the_feds_fueled_the_militarization_of_police/; David Edwards, Ex-Seattle police 
chief: ‘Appalling’ to use tear gas on peaceful protestors, raw StOrY (Nov. 29, 2011, 1:13 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/
rs/2011/11/29/ex-seattle-police-chief-appalling-to-use-tear-gas-on-peaceful-protesters/.
206  E.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 669; Kealy, supra note 26, at 384 (“[The Posse Comitatus Act] reflects a strong 
American tradition against the domestic use of  the military that stretches back before the founding of  the nation.”); 
see also Al Baker, When the Police Go Military, N.Y. timeS, Dec. 4, 2011, at SR6, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/04/sunday-review/have-american-police-become-militarized.html?pagewanted=all (noting that police 
officers share a “soldier’s ethos” because they carry deadly weapons and wear uniforms with patches denoting rank, 
“[b]ut beyond such symbolic and formal similarities, American law and tradition have tried to draw a clear line between 
police and military forces”). 
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the police.’”207  This clear separation traces its origins to the early days of  the Republic when our 
Founders, drawing from the English development of  police forces, feared the persistent presence of  
a standing army.208
The separation was codified just over a decade after the Civil War, as a result of  the President’s 
use of  the army to enforce the law and keep order at polling places in the South during the Recon-
struction era.209  The Posse Comitatus Act of  1878210 prohibits U.S. military personnel from partici-
pating in domestic law enforcement activities, unless expressly authorized by the Constitution or 
Congress.  The Act is a proscriptive law: facially, it imposes criminal penalties for those who employ 
the military to enforce civilian laws.211
B.  Blurring Lines
Notwithstanding the historical origins, those stark boundaries between the military and law 
enforcement are blurring.  A series of  laws passed in the 1980s in connection with the War on 
Drugs,212 beginning with the Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act in 1981,213 paved the 
207  Baker, supra note 208 (quoting Chief  Walter A. McNeil, President of  the International Association of  Chiefs of  
Police); see also David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers Be Peace Officers? The Waco Disaster and the Militarization 
of  American Law Enforcement, 30 akrOn l. rev. 619, 620 (1997) (“The idea was that law enforcement and the military are 
completely different, with the Army geared toward destroying enemies of  a different nationality, while law enforcement 
must serve persons largely friendly, who are guaranteed presumptions of  innocence and rights not appropriate when 
dealing with an enemy during times of  war.”).
208  See, e.g., Brown, supra note 15, at 665-67; Candidus Dougherty, “Necessity Hath No Law”: Executive Power and the Posse 
Comitatus Act, 31 CamPBell. l.rev. 1, 4-6 (2008); Raj Dhanasekaran, When Rotten Apples Return: How the Posse Comitatus 
Act of  1878 Can Deter Domestic Law Enforcement Authorities from Using Military Interrogation Techniques on Civilians, 5 COnn. 
PuB. int. l.J. 233, 245-48 (2006); Michael T. Cunningham, The Military’s Involvement in Law Enforcement: The Threat is Not 
What You Think, 26 Seattle u. l. rev. 699, 700-01 (2003); Kealy, supra note 26, at 390-92.
209  E.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948) (“[T]he immediate objective of  the [Posse 
Comitatus Act] was to put an end to the use of  federal troops to police state elections in the ex-Confederate states where 
the civil power had been reestablished.”); see also Cunningham, supra note 210, at 703; Kealy, supra note 26, at 394-96.
210  The Posse Comitatus Act of  1878, ch. 263, § 15, 20 Stat. 152 (1878)  (current version codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
1385 (2012)) (The statute names only the Army and Air Force; however, the Navy and Marines are similarly restricted 
by Department of  Defense Directive 5525.5 (Jan. 15, 1986).  The Act does not apply to the Coast Guard or National 
Guard.); see also Cunningham, supra note 210, at 702-04 (explaining some court have interpreted the Act to apply to other 
branches, except the Coast Guard). 
211  18 U.S.C. § 1385 (“Whoever . . . willfully uses any part of  the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”); see also 
Cunningham, supra note 210, at 702-03 (noting that it does not appear that anyone has ever been prosecuted under the 
Act); Dan Bennett, The Domestic Role of  the Military in America: Why Modifying or Repealing the Posse Comitatus Act Would Be A 
Mistake, 10 lewiS & Clark l. rev. 935, 940 (2006).
212  E.g., Radley Balko, Overkill: The Rise of  Paramilitary Police Raids in America, CatO inStitute 7 (2006) (listing and 
describing laws). 
213  10 U.S.C., ch. 18.
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way for increased cooperation and sharing between the military and law enforcement.214  Moreover, 
the black-letter law does not prohibit law enforcement departments themselves from behaving more 
like soldiers than police officers.215  In effect, the Posse Comitatus Act — and the apt division be-
tween forces with distinct objectives that it embodies — is increasingly closer to falling moot.  
The war on terror has accelerated the militarization of  state and local law enforcement. From 
body armor to assault rifles to pilotless surveillance drones to bomb robots, state and local law 
enforcement have indeed received the go-ahead and the resources to militarize their departments.216  
For instance, the Fargo, North Dakota police department now boasts an armored truck, “complete 
with a rotating turret.”217  Many beat cops now carry assault rifles, and in some jurisdictions, assault 
rifles are standard issue in patrol cars.218  Approximately 17,000 local law enforcement agencies “are 
equipped with such military equipment as Blackhawk helicopters, machine guns, grenade launchers, 
battering rams, explosives, chemical sprays, body armor, night vision, rappelling gear and armored 
vehicles.”219  The small town of  Keene, New Hampshire recently received a grant to purchase an 
“eight-ton armored personnel vehicle” — a tank.220  The Nebraska State Patrol similarly boasts three 
“amphibious eight-wheeled tanks.”221
Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has reportedly provided more than $34 bil-
lion in grants to state and local law enforcement agencies to purchase military equipment.222   In 
214  See, e.g., Id. (describing Military Cooperation with Law Enforcement Act as “wide-reaching legislation [that] 
encouraged the military to give local, state, and federal police access to military bases, research, and equipment for drug 
interdiction . . ., authorized the military to train civilian police officers to use the newly available equipment . . ., [and] 
encouraged the military to share drug-war-related information with civilian police”); Kealy, supra note 26, at 409-14.
215  E.g., Kopel & Blackman, supra note 209, at 623 (discussing various loopholes in Posse Comitatus Act that allow 
law enforcement to use military equipment and receive military training); Rizer & Hartman, supra note 31.
216  E.g., Edwards, supra note 207, (reporting local police department purchases of  a $300,000 pilotless surveillance 
drone, $600 bulletproof  shields, and $180,000 bomb robots); see also Radley Balko, Scenes From Militarized America, huff. 
POSt (Nov. 19, 2012, 10:34 PM). http://www.huffingtonpost.com/radley-balko/scenes-from-militarized-a_b_2162360.
html (photos depicting police officers in full camouflage and face masks). 
217  Andrew Becker & G.W. Schulz, Local police stockpile high-tech, combat-ready gear, Center fOr inveStigative rePOrting 
(Dec. 21, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://americaswarwithin.org/articles/2011/12/21/local-police-stockpile-high-tech-combat-
ready-gear. 
218  Id. 
219  John W. Whitehead, Tanks on Main Street: The Militarization of  Local Police, huff. POSt (Jan. 4, 2012, 10:53 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-w-whitehead/police-militarization_b_1180875.html. 
220  Radley Balko, Police ‘Tank’ Purchase Riles New Hampshire Town, huff. POSt (Feb. 16, 2012, 8:41 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/16/police-tank-purchase-new-hampshire_n_1279983.html. 
221  Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Small-Town Cops Pile Up on Useless Military Gear, wired (June 26, 2012, 6:31 AM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/06/cops-military-gear/all/. 
222  Becker & Schulz, supra note 218; see also Radley Balko, A Decade After 9/11, Police Departments Are Increasingly 
Militarized, huff. POSt (Nov. 12, 2011, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/09/12/police-militarization-9-
11-september-11_n_955508.html.
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2011, the Department of  Defense through the “1033 program”223 gave away nearly $500 million 
worth of  “leftover military gear” to law enforcement agencies, including grenade launchers, military 
robots, assault rifles, and armored vehicles.224  In 2010, state and local departments received $212 
million in similar “leftover” military equipment.225  Indeed, the give-away program has been so broad 
that the Defense Department recently halted issuing any additional military weapons to law enforce-
ment agencies, but just “until [the Department] is satisfied that state officials can account for all the 
surplus guns, aircraft, Humvees and armored personnel carriers it has given police.”226
Beyond acquiring military weapons and equipment, state and local police officers have begun to 
adopt military tactics and act more like soldiers.227  This militarized behavior was especially clear in 
the responses to the Occupy movements across the country.228  From Zuccotti Park in Manhattan 
to the Occupy camp in Oakland, police officers entered many of  the protest sites as if  they were 
military units invading an enemy camp.229  In one particularly violent encounter, officers donning 
223  The “1033 Program” is named after Section 1033 of  the National Defense Authorization Act of  1997 and is 
intended to assist law enforcement agencies primarily with “counter-drug and counter-terrorism activities.”  PuB. l. 104-
201, 110 Stat. 2639 (Sept. 23, 1996); see also Balko, supra note 214, at 8 (“The National Defense Authorization Security 
Act of  1997, commonly called “1033” for the section of  the U.S. code assigned to it, created the Law Enforcement 
Support Program, an agency headquartered in Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.  The new agency was charged with streamlining the 
transfer of  military equipment to civilian police departments.  It worked.”).
224  Carlson, supra note 202; see also Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 222 (“In 2011 alone, more than 700,000 items 
were transferred to police departments for a total value of  $500 million.”).
225  Carlson, supra note 202.
226  Associated Press, Pentagon halts free weapons for police amid fears of  unaccounted guns, Humvees, planes, n.Y. dailY newS 
(June 8, 2012, 1:17 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/pentagon-halts-free-weapons-police-fears-
unaccounted-guns-humvees-planes-article-1.1092140; see also Franceschi-Bicchierai, supra note 222 (reporting that DOD 
suspended the program after local police department was accused of  using the program to acquire and resell military 
equipment to others). 
227  See, e.g., Rizer & Hartman, supra note 31 (noting the increase of  S.W.A.T. teams in American police departments 
and their use in executing “minor operations such as serving warrants” exemplify the militarization of  the police 
department); see also Bob Ostertag, Militarization Of  Campus Police, huff. POSt (Nov. 19, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/bob-ostertag/uc-davis-protest_b_1103039.html (arguing that even campus police are now 
militarized). 
228  See, e.g., Baker, supra note 208 (describing the militarized response of  police officers to Occupy protestors); 
Brad Lockwood, The Militarizing of  Local Police, fOrBeS (Nov. 30, 2011, 11:49 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
bradlockwood/2011/11/30/the-militarizing-of-local-police/ (“During the crackdown on ‘Occupy’ protectors recently, 
police appeared like soldiers—armed with automatic weapons, Tasers, pepper spray, riot gear et al. . . .”). 
229  See e.g., Baker, supra note 208; Norm Stamper, Paramilitary Policing From Seattle to Occupy Wall Street,  natiOn, Nov. 
28, 2011 (“[T]he police response to the Occupy movement, most disturbingly visible in Oakland — where scenes 
resembled a war zone and where a marine remains in serious condition from a police projectile — brings into sharp 
relief  the acute and chronic problems of  American law enforcement.”). 
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full riot gear wielded tear gas canisters to clear Occupy Oakland protesters,230 one of  who was criti-
cally injured after he was hit with a beanbag projectile at close range.231  Such trends have since been 
duplicated in officers’ encounters with other protestors throughout the country, including in Burl-
ington, Vermont, where the police deployed riot shields, rubber bullets, and physical force to clear a 
group of  unarmed protesters.232  
To be sure, law enforcement agencies throughout the country have demonstrated their willing-
ness to adopt military-like tactics and behaviors before September 11, 2001 and the war on terror.233  
Most notably, the federal government’s declaration of  a “War on Drugs” injected millions of  dol-
lars in military equipment into state and local law enforcement agencies,234 and thereafter police 
units across the country began employing heavily armed, militarized SWAT units.235  Since then, 
militarized SWAT units have proliferated nationwide,236 and are frequently “deployed” to respond 
to nonviolent crimes237 and execute routine search warrants238 — in stark opposition to the hostage 
situations or dangerous standoffs for which they were originally conceived.239
230  E.g., Sarah Maslin Nir & Matt Flegenheimer, Hundreds Held in Oakland Occupy Protest, n.Y. timeS, at A11 (Jan. 30, 
2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/us/occupy-oakland-protest-leads-to-hundreds-of-arrests.html; 
Ruben Navarrette Jr., Are police becoming militarized?, CNN (Nov. 9, 2011, 11:26 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/09/
opinion/navarrette-militarized-police/index.html (“The siege in Oakland, where police have repeatedly clashed with 
protesters, reminds us that there’s one other thing that police officers shouldn’t do: impersonate soldiers.”); Malia Wollan, 
J. David Goodman, & Sarah Maslin Nir, Police Fire Tear Gas at Occupy Protesters in Oakland, N.Y. Times (Oct. 26, 2011, 
12:22 AM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/police-said-to-fire-tear-gas-at-protesters-in-oakland-calif/.
231  Gavin Aronsen, Scott Olsen, Iraq Vet Hurt by OPD Projectile: “I’m Not Alright”, mOther JOneS (May 1, 2012, 10:13 
AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2012/05/scott-olsen-occupy-oakland-may-day. 
232  Dylan Kelley, Peaceful Protesters Put Down by Militarized Police Force, vermOnt COmmOnS (July 31, 2012, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.vtcommons.org/blog/peaceful-protesters-put-down-militarized-police-force.
233  See, e.g., Balko, supra note 215, at 1 (“Over the last 25 years, America has seen a disturbing militarization of  
its civilian law enforcement, along with a dramatic and unsettling rise in the use of  paramilitary police units (most 
commonly called Special Weapons and Tactics, or SWAT) for routine police work);  Brown, supra note 15, at 654-57 
(describing generally America’s militarization throughout twentieth century); Dhanasekaran, supra note 210, at 251 
(noting that “by 1997 SWAT teams could be found in ninety percent of  cities with populations of  50,000 or above”); 
Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of  Paramilitary Units, 44 SOC. 
PrOBS. 1 (1997).
234  Michelle Alexander, the new Jim CrOw 73-77 (2010); see also Lockwood, supra note 229 (noting that the Clinton 
administration gave 1.2 million military items to law enforcement “under the guise of  the ‘War on Drugs’”); Balko, 
supra note 215, at 7 (“The election of  Ronald Reagan in 1980 brought new funding, equipment and a more active drug-
policing role for paramilitary police units across the country.”).
235  See Balko, supra note 215, at 6-7 (describing history of  SWAT units, beginning with Los Angeles police chief  Daryl 
F. Gates in 1966, and through their increased use in the 1980s).
236  Id. at 9 (reporting that in 1997, ninety percent of  U.S. cities with populations of  50,000 or more had at least one 
SWAT team — twice as many as in mid-1980s); Kealy, supra note 26, at 386. 
237  Balko, supra note 215, at 6-7 (SWAT teams used for routine marijuana policing). 
238  Id. at 11 (“In small- to medium-sized cities . . . [eighty] percent of  SWAT callouts are now for warrant service.  In 
large cities, it’s about [seventy-five] percent.”).
239  E.g., Kealy, supra note 26, at 385 (“Developed in the late 1960s to respond to particularly dangerous situations, 
such as hostages, barricaded suspects, or hijackers, SWAT teams were originally much like regular police officers, but 
better equipped and utilized on only rare occasions.”). 
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The current, post-9/11 phase of  militarization builds upon this trend in two ways.  First, the 
“war” from which the militarization is derived is no longer metaphorical.  Although the U.S. has de-
clared war on abstractions in the past,240 this war on an abstraction is literal — real battles have been 
fought in Afghanistan and thousands of  lives have been lost.241  Drone strikes have claimed real ca-
sualties and struck true fear of  battle in the minds of  those living in the targeted regions.242  Against 
this backdrop, and bolstered by the pervasive threat rhetoric concerning the risk of  homegrown 
terrorism, there is a real risk of  mission creep — an impetus for law enforcement officers to carry 
forward and execute the military’s mission to protect the homeland, to be on the side of  “good” in 
the wider struggle for moral order.243 
Second, the militarization of  state and local law enforcement has transcended the bounds from 
which it arose.  Police officers are acting like soldiers in operations far removed from purported 
counterterrorism operations, including in criminal justice and immigration contexts.244  Law enforce-
ment agencies are acquiring military weapons and equipment free of  restrictions on use, leading to 
an increasingly militarized border and militarized responses to protests and rallies.245  As the trend 
continue, retreating from a soldier’s ethos to a public safety officer will become increasingly diffi-
cult.246  Employing such characteristics of  the war paradigm absent judicial scrutiny over whether the 
240  See, e.g., Stuart, supra note 117, at 2 (discussing metaphorical wars on policy matters, such as War on Poverty and 
Cold War). 
241  See, e.g., id. at 2-3 (“[T]oday’s increasing use of  militaristic rhetoric by politicians and pundits goes beyond 
its metaphorical use as a war against an abstraction.  Instead, the use of  such language is becoming literal, and that 
rhetorical shift matters.  Today’s militaristic rhetoric is increasingly identifying fellow citizens as enemies in a literal war.”); 
Gabor Rona, A Bull in a China Shop: The War on Terror and International Law in the United States, 39 Cal. w. int’l l.J. 135, 
145 (2008) (discussing U.S.’s “literal use of  the term war on terror”); David A. Bosworth, American Crusade: The Religious 
Roots of  the War on Terror, 7 BarrY l. rev. 65, 105 (2006) (“[T]he War on Terror has been interpreted as a literal war 
rather than a metaphorical one . . ..”). 
242  See, e.g., Scott Shane, Drone Strikes to Be Investigated, n.Y. timeS, Oct. 25, 2012, at A10, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/americas/drone-strikes-to-be-investigated.html. 
243  See, e.g., Sarah E. Waldeck, Cops, Community Policing, and the Social Norms Approach to Crime Control: Should One Make 
Us More Comfortable With the Others?, 34 ga. l. rev. 1253, 1263-67 (2000) (discussing “occupational subculture” of  
reform-era policing, dominated by belief  that policing “reflected a wider moral struggle” and officers as “strong and 
courageous warriors who demonstrated their bravery by intervening in potentially dangerous situations”); Charles P. 
Pierce, Occupy Oakland and the Militarization of  America’s Police, Esquire (Oct. 26, 2011, 11:38 AM), http://www.esquire.
com/blogs/politics/occupy-oakland-6530274 (“You put enough war propaganda into the heads of  young men, hand 
them weapons, and give them license to use them, and they are not going to see fellow citizens through the visors on 
their helmets.  They are going to see enemies.  Wars have enemies.”). 
244  See, e.g., Rizer & Hartman, supra note 15 (“[P]olice departments have employed their newly acquired military 
weaponry not only to combat terrorism but also for everyday patrolling.”); Pooja Gehi, Gendered (In)security: Migration and 
Criminalization in the Security State, 35 harv. J.l. & gender 357, 382 (2012) (“[I]n the period since September 11, 2001, 
the drastic enhancement and militarization of  law enforcement overall has worsened conditions for those targeted by 
[the U.S. criminal and immigration systems].”).
245  See Associated Press, supra note 227.
246  Carlson, supra note 173, (“If  you look at the police department, their creed is to protect and to serve. A soldier’s 
mission is to engage his enemy in close combat and kill him. Do we want police officers to have that mentality? Of  
course not.”)
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battlefield in the war on terror is truly a global one risks normalizing the exception — permatizing 
a militarized police force throughout the United States.  The threat of, effectively, a standing army 
executing the laws within the U.S. —the very notion feared by our Founders — is real.247  
C.  Dangerous Consequences
Although, in time, threat rhetoric may shift, permatizing the militarization of  state and local 
law enforcement carries dangerous consequences.248 Our fundamental conceptualization of  a law 
enforcement officer is shifting in multiple ways, both in the minds of  the officers and in the minds 
of  the public, leading to changes in the ways in which both groups perceive each other.  Accord-
ingly, we risk inflicting damage to the paramount constitutional protections due to civilians under the 
criminal law paradigm.249
Incorporating military training and military tactics into civilian life leads to a shift in the mind of  
an officer.250  When officers’ equipment and training mirror that of  a soldier, their presumption and 
outlook toward their duties shift.251  In an officer’s mind, the public ceases to be comprised of  fellow 
citizens, and instead becomes the enemy.  When the police confront citizens as enemies, their tra-
ditional role to “protect and serve” the public fades away.252  As former Chief  of  the Seattle Police 
Department explains, “What emerges is a picture of  a vital public-safety institution perpetually at 
war with its own people.”253
247  See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 210, at 48-49 (“Having a police force that uses the same techniques as the military 
is not far from having a standing army executing laws.  At the end of  the day, the difference between a militarized police 
force and a military force policing is nonexistent.”). 
248  For a compelling discussion of  the consequences of  a militarized police force in Northern Ireland, see Kealy, supra 
note 26, at 420-23. 
249  See, e.g., Dhanasekaran, supra note 210, at 252-53 (“[W]hen police units are trained by the military, they behave like 
the military, and this often leads to disastrous consequences in the civilian world.  Specifically, when police departments 
engage in the calculus of  when a suspect’s constitutionally rights trump the use of  force, they err on the side of  using force.”) 
(emphasis added). 
250  E.g., Dhanasekaran, supra note 210, at 253- (arguing militarized police force might incorporate “military 
interrogation techniques”, including torture into law enforcement practices). 
251  Rizer & Hartman, supra note 15 (arguing that military equipment and training for police “represent a fundamental 
change in the nature of  law enforcement”); see also Balko, supra note 222 (“The problem with this mingling of  domestic 
policing with military operations is that the two institutions have starkly different missions.  The military’s job is to 
annihilate a foreign enemy.  Cops are charged with keeping the peace, and with protecting the constitutional rights of  
American citizens and residents.  It’s dangerous to conflate the two.”).  
252  See, e.g., Dhanasekaran, supra note 210, at 251-52 (The resulting “warrior ethic” [of  military-trained and military-
armed police officers] which presumes guilt and responds with overwhelming force is routinely applied against 
Americans.  This is diametrically opposed to the mission of  a police officer, who should use minimal force and protect 
the constitutional rights of  the accused.”); Baker, supra note 208 (reporting that officers must realize that protestors are 
not enemies but people that police might need to engage with in future); Rizer & Hartman, supra note 31 (“The most 
serious consequence of  the rapid militarization of  American police forces . . . is the subtle evolution in the mentality 
of  the ‘men in blue’ from ‘peace officer’ to soldier.”); Stamper, supra note 230 (“Everyday policing is characterized by a 
SWAT mentality, every other 911 call a military mission.”).
253  Stamper, supra note 230.
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For the public, the shift in the conceptualization of  law enforcement is two-pronged.  In the 
short-term, when the police act like soldiers the adage that a police officer is the one individual 
among strangers deserving of  trust and providing protection quickly disintegrates.254  Hostility meets 
hostility; distrust garners distrust.255  And where the public does not trust the police, one of  the fore-
most models of  policing and one that the Executive is heavily promoting to counter homegrown 
terrorism256 — community policing — necessarily fails.257
In the long-term, as police behavior changes, the public’s bounds of  acceptable law enforcement 
behavior will shift.  With each increment that law enforcement gains in its militarization, backed by 
the threat rhetoric that purports to require the militarization to protect the nation, the degree of  
scrutiny exercised by the public is likely to decrease.258  Similar to the public’s post-Iraq War percep-
tion that the U.S. was better off  after the invasion despite the flawed intelligence that led to it,259 the 
public appears to accept their police officers looking and behaving more like soldiers because the 
threat rhetoric tells us that the enemy is near.  For instance, two-thirds of  Americans now express 
little concern about police departments acquiring drones, a military technology, on domestic soil.260  
With these shifts in the conceptualization of  law enforcement comes the risk of  the erosion of  
many of  the fundamental constitutional protections embodied within the criminal law paradigm.261  
The presumption on which police approach their duties becomes one of  defeat, not protection; the 
254  Navarrette Jr., supra note 231 (“Police officers have the power to either make their job simpler or more difficult.  
If  they treat people well and build relations, people will cooperate.  They’ll have leads, witnesses and informants.  But 
if  they see the people they’re supposed to ‘protect and serve’ the way an occupying army sees the native population, 
they’re going to encounter resistance, suspicion, defiance and other things that make their job harder.  That’s a recipe for 
chaos.”).
255  E.g., Whitehead, supra note 220 (“[I]n the past, law enforcement strove to provide a sense of  security, trust, and 
comfort[;] the impression conveyed today is one of  power, dominance and inflexible authority.”). 
256  Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, white hOuSe (Aug. 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf  (naming local government, 
law enforcement, and Mayor’s offices as local institutions which the federal government can support to combat violent 
extremism).
257  See, e.g., Baker, supra note 208 (“The more the police fail to defuse confrontations but instead help to create them 
— be it with their equipment, tactics or demeanor — the more ties with community members are burned.”); Franceschi-
Bicchierai, supra note 222 (“According to Stamper, having small local police departments go around with tanks and 
military gear has ‘a chilling effect on any effort to strengthen the relationship’ between the community and the cops.”); 
Robert W. Benson, Changing Police Culture: The Sine Qua Non of  Reform, 34 lOY. l.a.l.rev. 681, 688 (2001) (characterizing 
militarized law enforcement as the “antidote” to the community policing model). 
258  E.g., Kealy, supra note 26, at 387 (“[T]he threat of  terrorism may spur citizens to actively renounce liberty for 
safety.”). 
259  Supra note 151.
260  Scott Shackford, A Third of  Americans Worry About Police Getting Drones, reaSOn (Sept. 28, 2012, 12:38 PM), http://
reason.com/blog/2012/09/28/a-third-of-americans-worry-about-police.  But see M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy 
Catalyst, 64 Stan. l. rev. Online 29 (2011) (arguing that drones “could be just the visceral jolt society needs to drag 
privacy law into the twenty-first century”). 
261  M. Chris Fabricant, War Crimes and Misdemeanors: Understanding “Zero-Tolerance” Policing as a Form of  Collective 
Punishment and Human Rights Violation, 3 drexel l. rev. 373, 378 (2011) (“A consequence of  both the use of  war 
rhetoric and the warlike approach to addressing societal problems is the dehumanization of  citizens as ‘enemies’”.).
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public’s presumption that security trumps liberty results in acceptance of  increasingly intrusive and 
abusive practices.  Ultimately, when those charged with upholding public safety approach the public 
as enemies, those very protections and presumptions that our police have traditionally been trained 
to uphold face little hope of  remaining intact.262 
v.  COnCluSiOn
Through carefully crafted rhetoric of  the Executive, the September 11, 2001 attacks marked a 
fundamental change in the ways in which we collectively regard and respond to terrorism.  Whereas 
acts of  international terrorism on U.S. soil were traditionally conceived as criminal acts and alleged 
terrorists as criminal suspects, the September 11, 2001 attacks were acts of  war.  This shift altered 
the legal paradigm under which the nation responded to such acts, moving from the criminal law 
paradigm to the war paradigm — moving from a framework of  constitutional protections and the 
presumption of  innocence to a framework of  enemy designations and lethal force.  Moreover, the 
declaration of  a global war on terror permitted such action on a worldwide battlefield.  
This paradigm shift was possible due to the Executive’s declaration of  war on an abstract phe-
nomenon — terrorism.  It is of  little surprise that neither the U.S. nor international legal system has 
settled on a single definition of  terrorism because, in practical terms, terrorism is indefinable.  Ac-
cordingly, declaring war on an indefinable abstraction creates space for the Executive to harness the 
ambiguity of  abstract words and the power of  performative terms to define, shape, and color the 
present war on terror.
Threat rhetoric — the language employed by the Executive to identify and communicate to the 
citizenry the internal and external threats to the homeland — permeates the gaps that the absence 
of  a single definition of  terrorism creates, providing the concretization and contextualization neces-
sary to wage a war.  Threat rhetoric is particularly powerful in the war on terror because our no-
tion of  “security” has shifted since the early-to-mid twentieth century from a personal “democratic 
security” to a collective “national security” dominated by secrecy and Executive expertise.  The 2003 
invasion of  Iraq is a pertinent example of  the efficacy of  threat rhetoric: harnessing the power of  
words and control over the dissemination of  accurate intelligence information, the Bush adminis-
tration garnered public and congressional support for a war that later proved to be built on false 
premises.  
In a similar pattern, the Obama administration’s increasing use of  threat rhetoric surrounding 
homegrown terrorism is aimed toward garnering public support for increasingly intrusive counter-
terrorism policies and tactics in the U.S. — that is, extending the geographic scope of  the battlefield 
to the homeland and bringing characteristics of  the war paradigm within our borders — absent judi-
cial scrutiny.  Though the Judiciary was initially reluctant to accept the Executive’s expansive view of  
the battlefield, federal courts are now exercising increasing deference to the Executive on matters of  
national security. Indeed, when recently presented squarely with the question of  the extension of  the 
262  See, e.g., Kealy, supra note 26, at 423 (discussing militarization of  police in Northern Ireland and Patten 
Commission’s finding that the militarized training led to “inattention to human rights in practice”). 
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battlefield beyond Afghanistan, the courts refused to address the issue. 
To avoid affording the Executive full discretion to shape the battlefield and, accordingly, import 
characteristics of  the war paradigm into the U.S., the Judiciary must demand increased transpar-
ency from the Executive and conduct more fact-finding and exacting scrutiny in matters of  national 
security.  Not doing so risks permatizing the militarization of  state and local law enforcement and, 
accordingly, transforming the ways in which police officers and citizens perceive each other.  Dis-
integrating that vital separation of  police forces and military units on which our nation was built 
threatens to erode many of  the fundamental constitutional protections inherent to the U.S. criminal 
law paradigm. 
